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Abstract 
 
 Workers in modern teams that perform tasks over computer-mediated communication 
channels encounter challenges in building trust and performing effectively. Finding interventions 
to mitigate such losses could improve team performance. Collaborative critical thinking (CCT) 
training has the potential to improve trust, monitoring, and effectiveness in virtual teams. Using a 
simulated search-and-rescue task, the effects of CCT training, as compared with a control 
training, were evaluated in 105 three-member teams. No effects of CCT training were found on 
team positive or negative monitoring, team cognitive or affective trust, team efficacy, or team 
viability. However, teams trained in CCT reported consistently higher levels of team 
cooperation. Directions for future research are discussed so as to maximize the possibility that 
CCT might yet be an effective intervention.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Dynamic market conditions and enterprising enemies require that modern civilian and 
military organizations rapidly solve complex problems in the face of uncertainty. As a result, a 
majority of contemporary organizations have turned away from hierarchical personnel structures 
in favor of flatter configurations, which rely primarily on teams in order to accomplish 
organizational objectives. As communication technology has become more reliable and 
affordable, organizations have increasingly embraced virtual teams, in which team members 
work across geographic, temporal, or organizational boundaries.  
While virtual teams allow organizations to quickly and inexpensively bring together 
cross-disciplinary expertise to solve problems, make decisions, and accomplish goals not 
realizable by individuals alone, teamwork is a fragile enterprise. Face-to-face teamwork requires 
strong interpersonal and communication skills, the demands for which are often amplified when 
virtual teams interact over sparse communication channels. In order for teammates to be able to 
effectively collaborate and share responsibilities, they must trust one another, and the 
development of such interpersonal trust is, among other things, dependent on keen social skills.  
In order to make good decisions, teams must reduce situational uncertainty. One way 
teams can do this is by engaging in a process of collaborative critical thinking (CCT) wherein 
interdependent teammates break constrained group processes and thinking by collectively 
sharing siloed ideas, experience, knowledge, and information, critiquing assumptions, and 
generating alternative interpretations and solutions. I propose that the reduction of situational 
uncertainty through CCT is critically dependent on the reduction of interpersonal uncertainty 
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(i.e., the development of trust). That is, teammates must trust one another if they are to share 
information. 
If both trust development and good decision-making are pivotal determinants of team 
effectiveness, it is important to develop strategies to help teams enhance both of these processes. 
In the current study, I use a computer simulation of a search-and-rescue task to investigate how a 
collaborative critical thinking training intervention impacts trust development, attitudes, and 
performance in ad-hoc, virtual action teams. If teammates receive CCT training, this can create a 
norm of monitoring. While some forms of monitoring are associated with distrust, questioning 
one another’s thinking and monitoring out of genuine care and concern for a teammate’s 
performance, as is the goal in CCT, can be a signal of trust. Furthermore, if CCT training makes 
teams communicate more frequently, this will dilate the channel for the exchange of social and 
task-related information, both robust predictors of trust. I thus contend that the trust-CCT 
relationship is bidirectional; trust among teammates is necessary to engage in CCT, but partaking 
in CCT also builds trust.  
The literature review for the current study begins with a description of the setting within 
which contemporary teams operate and progresses to covers topics related to virtual teams, trust 
development, decision-making, and collaborative critical thinking. Finally, I propose several 
hypotheses and a design for an empirical investigation of my hypotheses. 
The Landscape of Contemporary Team Decision-Making 
Market and technology changes have driven structural changes in organizations. Burns & 
Stalker (1961) describe two types of organizational structures. The first type of structure is called 
mechanistic. Mechanistic structures feature centralized decision-making, high standardization 
and formalization, low differentiation of tasks, and low levels of integration across, for example, 
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divisions. This type of structure operates effectively and efficiently in a stable market 
environment where decisions, changes, and innovations don’t necessarily need to be made 
quickly. The second type of structure is organic. Organic structures feature decentralized 
decision-making, little standardization and formalization, high differentiation of tasks, and high 
levels of integration across divisions. These structures are more useful in dynamic and uncertain 
environments because they allow information and knowledge to be propagated quickly through 
an organization. In turn, the organization can react quickly to changes. As Burns and Stalker 
indicated as early as 1961, organizations seem to be moving towards more organic structures in 
order to meet the ever-changing demands of consumers and clients as well as to respond to the 
sophisticated and dynamic strategies of competitors. Such fluid, flat organizations have less rigid 
boundaries around jobs roles and create jobs that require people to “thrive on chaos” and 
embrace change. 
Additionally, Dess, Rasheed, McLaughlin, Priem, and Robinson (1995) suggest that, 
while boundaries are rigid in traditional companies, the once unidimensional roles of managers 
and employees are being replaced by “fluid, ambiguous and deliberately ill-defined tasks and 
roles.” The previously bureaucratic, control-oriented, and hierarchical organizations are giving 
way to barrier/boundary free organizations (BFOs). In order to be viable, organizations need to 
quickly embrace the non-traditional structures that are more flexible, responsive, and highly 
tolerant of ambiguity. Furthermore, BFOs emphasize results over the maintenance of rigid 
internal relationships, which allows them to rapidly and continually adapt to dynamic world 
markets.  
The evolution away from traditional, hierarchical, authoritarian, and mechanistic 
organizations towards permeable, organic organizations implies that the targets and modes of 
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interaction, coordination, and control have also changed. That is, whereas before employees 
interacted primarily either with machinery or with those above or below them in a chain of 
command, the targets of interaction are now oriented more horizontally (e.g., teammates, other 
divisions) and externally (e.g., clients, customers, coalition partners). While Ferris, Davidson, 
and Perrewe (2010) point out that competing interests, scarce resources, and coalition building 
have always made organizations inherently social arenas, they also argue that the increased 
volume and variety of human interaction make employees with adept interpersonal skills, 
flexibility, and adaptability crucial in modern organizations.  
Although having good communication skills and job knowledge has always been 
important in organizations, these alone are not enough to function in the highly collaborative, 
participative, and democratic environments characteristic of modern organizations. Networking, 
negotiating shared interests, building trust, and sharing resources are pivotal for working in self-
managed teams, across parts of an organization (e.g., interdivisional task forces), and with 
external stakeholders (e.g., clients, customers) (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Dess et al., 1995; Ferris 
et al., 2010). In order to achieve results, employees must coordinate and cooperate with both 
internal and external constituencies to establish beneficial relationships and exercise influence 
over relevant targets over whom they do not necessarily have line authority, but in whose work 
they have a stake nonetheless. Furthermore, superiors issue instructions and decisions less 
frequently. Instead, knowledge is distributed across a network, and employees need to learn how 
to capture and share information, dispense advice, and coach others. Employees must also work 
with teammates and stakeholders to ensure that people stay unified, satisfied, and productive 
well as learn how to resolve conflicts without relying on mechanisms of traditional authority 
structures. Costa (2003) aptly summarizes that, “new emphasis [in contemporary organizations] 
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is given on interpersonal and group dynamics at the workplace, where trust is seen as one of the 
critical elements” (italics added, p. 605). I later expand on Costa’s idea and review interpersonal 
and team trust as a pivotal determinant of team processes and outcomes.  
Teams 
Challenged with the task of handling large of amounts of complex information in 
dynamic environments that require the collaboration of expertise across multiple areas, 
organizations have embraced teams as relevant and effective tools (Townsend, DeMarie, & 
Hendrickson, 1998). Teamwork requires team members to coordinate, share responsibilities, rely 
on one another, and participate in decision-making to accomplish personal and collective goals 
not otherwise achievable through individual effort (A.C. Costa, 2003). Furthermore, virtual 
teams have become nearly ubiquitous in contemporary organizations. In a recent investigation by 
the  Economist's Intelligence Unit (2009), 78% of participants from a wide range of industries 
reported working in virtual teams currently or in the recent past. Virtual teams are teams whose 
members are geographically, temporally, and/or organizationally dispersed and who spend a 
substantial portion of their time collaborating through technology. The evolution from face-to-
face to virtual teams has largely been an organic response to increased global competition and 
interdependency across departments and business units (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009). 
While virtual teams are a practical, effective, and cheap solution for organizational members to 
collaborate, there are some substantive differences in trust and performance outcomes when they 
are compared with face-to-face teams. Below, I define teams and virtual teams, discuss their 
necessity, and compare their effectiveness. 
Defining teams and subtypes. A variety of definitions of teams have been proposed in 
the literature. For example, Costa (2003) defines work teams as “organizational groups, that have 
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some goal or attainable outcome which team members contribute to and are responsible for, and 
where there is sufficient task interdependence such that individuals need to develop shared 
understandings and expected patterns of behavior.” (p. 606 ) Salas, Dickinson, Converse, and 
Tannenbaum (1992) define a team as "a distinguishable set of two or more people who interact 
dynamically, interdependently, and adaptively toward a common and valued goal/object/mission, 
who have each been assigned specific roles or functions to perform, and who have a limited life 
span of membership" (p. 4). These two definitions complement one another; each argues that 
teams are goal-driven groups consisting of multiple members with distinct yet interdependent 
roles. The Costa (2003) definition additionally specifies that teams develop common mental 
frameworks, and Salas et al. (1992) adds that teams are temporary, meaning that they “work 
interdependently for an extended time to accomplish a common objective in a limited time span” 
(Webber, 2008). 
Teams are often assembled to accomplish a specific goal and are disbanded when their 
purpose has been served. Due to the ever-changing composition of talent, teammates often have 
not had an opportunity to collaborate with one another in the past; such groups are called ad-hoc 
teams (Stone, Kaminka, Kraus, & Rosenschein, 2010). For instance, when disasters strike, 
governments and relief agencies need to quickly assemble ad hoc teams or even teams-of-teams 
(J. M. Schraagen & van de Ven, 2008; J. M. Schraagen & van de Ven, 2011). Members of crisis 
management teams are typically unfamiliar with one another due to the infrequency of large-
scale catastrophic events, and are unlikely to work together again in the future (Jarvenpaa & 
Leidner, 1998). Furthermore, such teams can be characterized as action teams wherein, 
“expertise, information, and tasks are distributed across specialized individuals, [and] team 
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effectiveness depends on rapid, complex, and coordinated task behavior, and the ability to 
dynamically adapt to the shifting demands of the situation” (Ferris et al., 1996, p. 254). 
It is unlikely that a central individual can effectively manage all facets of the complex 
processes characteristic of modern organizations. Organizations have thus become flatter such 
that hierarchical choreography is often replaced with the horizontal interactions characteristic of 
self-managing teams, which are groups of “interdependent individual[s] that can self-regulate on 
relatively whole tasks” (emphasis added; Cohen, Ledford, & Spreitzer, 1996 from Langfred, 
2004). Finally, all of the aforementioned team subtypes are critically dependent on effective 
collaboration processes. Hess, Freeman, and Coovert (2008) define collaboration as a “social 
process by which people exchange information and perspectives, create knowledge and discuss 
and integrate the implications of these processes” (p. 241). Collaboration thus creates an 
atmosphere of constructive dissent where members of self-governing teams are encouraged to 
cultivate independent thought and freely express ideas in order to generate novel knowledge 
(Olivares, 2005). 
Information age warfare. While the transition from top-down control processes to team-
based structures in civilian organizations can largely be attributed to market and technology 
changes, a parallel transformation has occurred in military organizations as a result of 
information-driven warfare (Alberts, Garstka, Hayes, & Signori, 2001). New and rapidly 
changing adversaries have necessitated structural and technological changes in command and 
control (C2) environments. Relatively impermeable boundaries and the restrictive, top-down 
control characteristic of traditional C2 structures allows for stable and dependable operations in 
the face of static adversaries. However, such structures are not conducive to the rapid 
reconfiguration of personnel and resources required for engaging the cunning and 
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unconventional enemies innate to asymmetric warfare (Rosen, Fiore, Salas, Letsky, & Warner, 
2008).  
Modern command and control environments are thus advanced socio-technical systems 
underpinned by relatively unstructured, agile teams (Cooke, Gorman, & Winner, 2007). Teams 
in modern C2 are often composed of heterogeneous (e.g., multidisciplinary, multicultural), 
rotating members with little to no previous joint experience. The teams must operate and adapt in 
time-pressured environments to accomplish highly interdependent missions. Tasked with solving 
ad-hoc, short duration problems, teams are required to make accelerated decisions and take 
decisive action in the face of ambiguous cues and large amounts of complex, dynamic, and 
uncertain information (M. Letsky, 2007; M. P. Letsky, Warner, Fiore, Rosen, & Salas, 2007). 
Military command and control settings are thus natural habitats for the types of teams previously 
described (e.g., self-managing, ad hoc, mission-critical, action teams), albeit with intensified 
stress and stakes. The present study simulates an emergency search-and-rescue operation, which 
is often undertaken by military teams (e.g., Coast Guard). Although no enemies are present, 
teammates unfamiliar with one another will be faced with uncertainty, a common objective, and 
high task interdependence. Team members will be required to coordinate, collaborate, and 
problem solve in a complex and rapidly evolving environment.  
Virtual teams. Another dimension along which teams can differ is the communication 
medium subserving team interactions. While teams have traditionally met face-to-face (FtF), 
military and civilian organizations are increasingly composing teams that are geographically, 
temporally, and organizationally distributed (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). As product cycles 
have become compressed and as companies have distributed and globalized their work through 
offshoring and outsourcing activities, building and managing virtual teams (VTs) has become an 
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attractive option to overcome the space, time, and relational constraints that burden FtF teams 
(Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998; Kirkman, Rosen, Tesluk, & Gibson, 2004; M. Letsky, 2007; 
Townsend et al., 1998; Warkentin, Sayeed, & Hightower, 1997). Enabled by developments in 
information and communication technologies (ICTs; Robert, Denis, & Hung, 2009), VTs are 
enticing because they offer the “flexibility, responsiveness, lower costs, and improved resource 
utilization necessary to meet ever-changing task requirements in highly turbulent and dynamic 
global business environments” (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998, p. 791). 
Defining virtual teams. After reviewing and integrating many definitions of virtual teams, 
Martins, Gilson, and Maynard (2004) define virtual teams as “teams whose members use 
technology to varying degrees in working across locational, temporal, and relational boundaries 
to accomplish an interdependent task” (p. 808). This definition is particularly useful because it 
supplements but does not change the definition of teams proposed above. That is, a virtual team 
is, first and foremost, a team – it is temporary, goal-driven, has interdependent roles, and 
involves shared responsibility (MacDonnell, O’Neill, Kline, & Hambley, 2009). The difference, 
then, between a colocated team (i.e., FtF) and a virtual team is the presence of technology-
supported “virtualness” as a team characteristic. In the Martins et al. (2004) definition, the 
locational boundary refers to the physical separation of team members (e.g., separated 
workstations within a single workplace, one workstation in India and another in China). The 
temporal boundary refers to the separation of communication and performance times across team 
members (e.g., differences in shifts or time zones, differences in team lifecycle). Finally, the 
relational boundary refers to differences in culture and the permeability of organizational 
boundaries (e.g., teams choosing teammates based on “what they know” rather than “who they 
know”) (Martins et al., 2004).  
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Virtuality. Forming relationships, communicating, interacting, and completing work in 
distributed teams requires members to utilize ICT networks (Aubert & Kelsey, 2003; 
MacDonnell et al., 2009) to engage in computer-mediated communication (CMC), also 
commonly referred to as computer supported cooperative work (CSCW; Coovert & Foster-
Thompson, 2001; Thompson & Coovert, 2006). Laboratory-based research has often 
dichotomized face-to-face and virtual teams. That is, teams in these studies are operationalized 
such that they either exclusively interact virtually or face-to-face. However, it is important to note 
that Martins et al.'s (2004) definition does not specify that a team must solely rely on ICTs to 
function. In fact, it explicitly states that VTs “use technology to varying degrees” (italics mine). 
In application, teams are often hybrids, which utilize a combination of face-to-face and virtual 
interactions (Bjørn & Ngwenyama, 2009; Griffith & Neale, 2001; Maznevski & Chudoba, 2000). 
Therefore, while former definitions reserved the “virtual” label only for those teams that never 
met face-to-face, current treatments typically described a team’s virtuality as a matter of degree 
or otherwise necessitate that electronic communication represent a substantial or majority portion 
of team interactions (e.g., Gibson & Cohen, 2003; MacDonnell et al., 2009; Maznevski & 
Chudoba, 2000).  
 Many technologies are available to support virtual team communication and 
performance. For example, whereas virtual teams previously had to rely on “lean” 
communication technologies such as text-based chat and e-mail, more advanced groupware, such 
as tele- and video-conferencing, are now available (MacDonnell et al., 2009; Thompson & 
Coovert, 2006). These higher fidelity options allow for increased social bandwidth in electronic 
communication, and yet are still affordable enough to offset the travel and infrastructure costs 
associated with face-to-face work (Thompson & Coovert, 2006). Furthermore, ICTs allow 
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multiple parties to simultaneously participate (MacDonnell et al., 2009), for records to be kept of 
all communications, for synchronous or asynchronous communication (Warkentin et al., 1997), 
and for the incorporation of collaboration and productivity tools that assist team members in the 
decision-making process and the “sophisticated collection, processing, management, retrieval, 
transmission, and display of data and knowledge” (MacDonnell et al., 2009, p. 2).  
  Although most accounts of virtuality focus exclusively on the extent to which a team 
uses ICTs to communicate and accomplish tasks, Kirkman & Mathieu (2005) propose an 
expanded framework for evaluating team virtuality. The model consists of three non-orthogonal 
dimensions – extent of use of virtual tools, informational value, and synchronicity. The first 
dimension is the extent of use of virtual tools, as discussed above in Martins et al.'s (2004) 
definition of VTs. The second dimension is informational value. This is based on the idea of 
media richness (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Venkatesh & Johnson, 2002), which differentiates 
between “lean” and “rich” ICTs based on their information-carrying capacity. With respect to 
communication technology, text chat is considered a lean channel (i.e., high virtuality) while 
videoconferencing is considered a rich channel (i.e., low virtuality) because it provides both 
verbal and nonverbal information. Technology for conveying data can also be categorized along 
a low-high virtuality continuum. For instance, providing a verbal description of a restaurant 
design may be considered highly virtual, whereas constructing and sharing a 3D “walk-through” 
is considered less virtual. Kirkman & Mathieu's (2005) final dimension, synchronicity, refers to 
whether exchanges are lagged (off-line communication, more virtual) or real-time (on-line 
communication, less virtual) such that members can simultaneously exchange information. 
Whether asynchronous or synchronous exchanges are preferred depends on the task team 
members are engaged in. For example, when reviewing a written product for quality assurance, 
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asynchronous communication may be preferred so that a team member has time to process it and 
craft feedback without the pressure of a “hovering” teammate. On the other hand, it would be 
dangerous to use asynchronous communication when decisions need to be made quickly about a 
target during a combat operation.  
The present study makes use of synchronous communication technology because the 
search-and-rescue task requires participants to problem-solve under time pressure. Participants 
must also use “on-line” communication to coordinate their strategies. Although a voice chat 
client is available in the simulation system, participants will only be allowed to communicate 
through a text-based chat window. Although this is perhaps one of the most impoverished ICTs, 
it will allow me to investigate the lower-boundary (i.e., highest degree of virtuality) of virtual 
collaborative critical thinking effectiveness. 
Virtual team effectiveness. Many studies have investigated whether virtual teams are 
more effective than face-to-face teams. Some advantages of virtual teams are that they can 
increase the range, capacity, depth, and speed of information dissemination, access, and 
exchange (Warkentin et al., 1997). They can also mitigate process losses that occur in face-to-
face settings. For example, virtual interactions can be more intimate and encourage more 
participation than face-to-face interactions since virtual team members can be less formal and 
less concerned with etiquette (e.g., turn-taking, formalities, impressions) (Thompson & Coovert, 
2006). This, in turn, can reduce anxiety about judgment by others and embolden team members 
to defend opinions and consider alternatives that may otherwise not get discussed in face-to-face 
teams as a result of evaluation apprehension (Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & Sethna, 1991; Kiesler & 
Cummings, 2002). Furthermore, asynchronous virtual communication can reduce stress and 
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distractions, while increasing privacy for team members and allowing them the time to “put their 
best face forward” (e.g., carefully crafting an email). 
There are also many limitations to virtual teams. For example, team members must learn 
and adapt to new information and communication technologies, while a fear of electronic 
monitoring and the existence of a communications archive may inhibit some discussion 
(Townsend et al., 1998). Warkentin et al. (1997) summarize that, in many instances, teams using 
ICTs communicate less effectively than colocated teams. He attributes a large portion of the 
deficiency to an insufficient amount of paraverbal (e.g., vocal inflection) and non-verbal (e.g., 
body language) context cues, which regulate the “give-and-take” orderliness of interaction (e.g., 
conversation flow, turn-taking, feedback acceptance). He acknowledges, though, that the deficit 
depends on the particular ICT. Whereas the lag in asynchronous communication can cause 
difficulty in maintaining a “train of thought”, synchronous VT discussions can get out-of-sync as 
a function of differences in team member reading or typing proficiencies as well information 
overload due to simultaneous discussions, which itself can lead to difficulties in building 
consensus (Walther & Burgoon, 1992). Jarvenpaa & Leidner (1998) also emphasizes the 
limitations of virtual work, explaining that, “low individual commitment, role overload, role 
ambiguity, absenteeism, and social loafing may be exaggerated in a virtual context.” (p. 791). 
Although a comprehensive review of the empirical work examining virtual team benefits 
and deficits is beyond the scope of this paper (see Martins et al., 2004 for a thorough summary), 
it seems that virtual team efficaciousness, when compared with colocated teams, depends on a 
variety of input parameters (e.g., task, technology, team size and composition). For example, 
Colquitt, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, LePine, and Sheppard (2002) found that team composition 
interacted with communication medium in predicting decision-making performance. Only those 
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teams composed of members high in openness to experience were able to reap the benefits of a 
computer-assisted communication strategy. In an important review of VT advantages and 
disadvantages, Thompson & Coovert (2006) conclude that the three most pressing challenges for 
virtual teams are: 1) ineffective and inefficient communication as a result of the low quality and 
quantity of exchanges, 2) difficulties in maintaining shared situational awareness, and 3) 
difficulties in developing cohesive and trusting interpersonal relationships.  
Thompson & Coovert's (2006) three challenges interact with one another. For example, 
monitoring teammates and controlling their resources is often not feasible in virtual teams 
(Aubert & Kelsey, 2003) as a result of impoverished communication and information channels 
(Challenge 1), yet teammate observation is critical for the formation of shared mental models 
(Challenge 2).  These first two challenges are particularly relevant for collaborative critical 
thinking, a major focus of this study. If teammates have difficulty transmitting mission 
information or developing a shared mental framework, it may also be challenging for them to 
engage in collaborative critical thinking. Challenge 3 is also critical because the development of 
quality interpersonal relationships has been associated with a variety of positive outcomes such 
as enhanced motivation, creativity, morale, and performance, another important outcome in the 
present study (Walther & Burgoon, 1992). Also, since it takes more effort to engage in 
computer-mediated communication, task-related communication is often more focused than in 
face-to-face teams (Challenge 1; Spears & Lea, 1994). While focused task-related 
communication may be positive, an increased communication threshold means that less social-
emotional data is exchanged among team members, thus retarding the development of relational 
links (Challenge 2, Chidambaram, 1996) such as trust, another major focus of the current study 
that I expand on below. 
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Trust 
Trust has been studied in a variety of different contexts and using various levels of 
analysis. These approaches have come from diverse fields such as sociology (e.g., Shapiro, 1990; 
Lewis & Weigert, 1985), anthropology (e.g., Hewlett, Lamb, & Scholmerick, 2000), economics 
(e.g., Rigdon, McCabe, & Smith, 2007), and psychology, and have included the study of 
interpersonal trust (e.g., McAllister, 1995), trust in teams (Langfred, 2004), trust in leaders 
(Dirks & Ferrin, 2002), and trust in organizations (Koufaris & Hampton-Sosa, 2004). This study 
evaluates how trusting individual team members are of their teams as a whole. While I 
specifically explore trust at the team level, the team trust approach is grounded in interpersonal 
trust since teams are composed of interacting individuals. 
Defining trust. Many definitions of trust have been proposed. For example, McAllister 
(1995) defines trust as the “extent to which a person is confident in, and willing to act on the 
basis of, the words, actions, and decisions of another” Wilson, Straus, and McEvily (2006) 
define trust as “confident positive expectations about the conduct of another.” (p. 18). Henttonen 
& Blomqvist (2005) define trust as “an actor’s expectation of the other actors’ capability, 
goodwill and self-reference visible in mutually beneficial behaviors enabling cooperation under 
risk” (pg. 108). Although the trust literature has not converged on a single definition of trust, two 
elements appear consistently across definitions. The first is an anticipation of positive behavior 
from others (A.C. Costa, 2003; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 1996), and the second is a willingness 
to assume vulnerability (A.C. Costa, 2003; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Zand, 1972). 
That is, the trustor subjects him or herself to risk or uncertainty under the assumption that the 
trustee will attempt to mitigate negative outcomes (e.g., not fulfilling commitments, disclosing 
confidential information) through well-intentioned behavior. Imperfect knowledge and risk thus 
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create the opportunity for trust, the belief that one can act confident that another party won’t take 
advantage (McAllister, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Wilson et al., 2006). For 
example, if a teammate has perfect knowledge about a colleague, then trust is unnecessary 
because no risk is involved. In situations of perfect ignorance, trust is also irrelevant as the 
trustor is unable to make any rational predictions of trustee behavior (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; 
McAllister, 1995).  
While the previous definitions of trust focus on trust between two individuals, Mayer et 
al.'s (1995) definition accommodates a wider variety of trust relationships. Mayer et al. (1995) 
define trust as “a willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the 
expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of 
the ability to monitor or control that other party” (p. 712). Mayer et al.'s (1995) definition is 
particularly useful because it not only captures the drivers of interpersonal trust, but the use of 
“party” makes the definition sufficiently broad to capture trust in teams-of-teams, employees and 
clients with organizations, supervisors with their work units, and team members with their teams. 
In these cases, trust is not a function of a one-to-one relationship between individuals, but rather 
is dependent on the reciprocal interactions of one-to-many and many-to-one. As such, Langfred 
(2004) adds to the definition of trust to account for these complex, emergent phenomena. He 
defines intrateam trust as an “aggregate perception of trustworthiness that team members have 
about one another” (p. 386). 
Models of trust. Team functioning can be characterized in terms of an Input-Process-
Output (IPO) model (Hackman & Morris, 1975). With respect to teams, Inputs represent the 
starting conditions of a group (e.g., team size, task, technology, composition). Processes are 
dynamic cognitive, verbal, and behavioral activities among team members that convert inputs to 
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outcomes to achieve a collective goal (e.g., goal setting, communication, monitoring, 
participation). Finally, outcomes represent the consequences of a team’s activities (e.g., team 
member satisfaction, performance; Martins et al., 2004). Although theories disagree on basal 
levels of trust in relationships as well as the antecedents of trust, they all agree that initial trust, 
whether high or low, can always be characterized. That is, individuals don’t interact in a trust or 
distrust vacuum. These levels of trust in turn can predict team processes such as team reflexivity 
and effort (De Jong & Elfring, 2010; McAllister, 1995), which in turn inform team outputs. 
Therefore, while Martins et al. (2004) characterizes trust as an interpersonal team process along 
with conflict, informality, cohesiveness, and group identity, other research considers trust as a 
team input (De Jong & Elfring, 2010; Dirks, 1999). It is conceivable that antecedents of trust 
such as team composition and team member characteristics can be considered inputs, trust a 
process, and performance or satisfaction, outcomes. However, the current study’s focus on 
collaborative critical thinking as a process to convert team trust into team performance is more 
concordant with the latter view of trust as an input. 
In a comprehensive review of models of interpersonal trust development, Lewicki, 
Tomlinson, and Gillespie (2006) summarize three major theoretical conceptions of psychological 
trust – unidimensional, two-dimensional, and transformational. While the behavioral approach is 
briefly discussed, Lewicki et al. (2006) largely dismiss this notion of trust because the 
operationalization of trust as cooperation or defection in economic games (e.g., a prisoner’s 
dilemma; Axelrod, 1984) is potentially confounded with other factors unrelated to trust such as 
boredom or decision error. The psychological approaches differ in how trust is defined, 
measured, the level at which trust begins, and what drives change in trust over time. 
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The unidimensional approach treats trust and distrust as opposing ends of a single 
continuum. Unidimensional trust (e.g., Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 
1995; Rousseau et al., 1998) is underpinned by two major processes. First, trust is derived from 
positive expectations about the intentions and behaviors of another party.  Second, a trustor 
assumes risk and liability in the actions of the trustee. It is important to note that although trust is 
theoretically unidimensional in these models (i.e., you either trust or distrust), trust is often 
further subdivided into multiple components such as cognitive trust, affective trust, and, 
occasionally, behavioral intentions (Cummings & Bromiley, 1996). Trust can begin either at zero 
or from a moderate-high level and forms, initially, as a result of antecedents such as personality, 
reputation, and roles. The further development of unidimensional trust then depends on factors 
such as communication with the trustee and violations of positive expectations, among others.  
McAllister (1995) proposed perhaps the most well-known model of unidimensional trust. 
His model features two principal forms of trust, cognitive-based (CBT) and affect-based trust 
(ABT). The former is derived from trustor beliefs about trustee competence, reliability, 
capability, and dependability while the latter is grounded in emotional bonds of care and concern 
between individuals and the trustworthy intentions of others (Cook & Wall, 1980). ABT 
develops as a result of a trustee’s altruistic or extra-role citizenship behavior (similar to 
benevolence in the Mayer et al., 1995 model) as well as the interaction frequency of a trustor and 
trustee such that the more social data is exchanged between the parties, the more confident a 
trustor’s attributions become. Webber (2008) also found that citizenship behavior is positively 
related to ABT, but did not find evidence of interaction frequency as a predictor. ABT generally 
takes a longer time to develop than CBT (McAllister, 1995; Williams, 2001), and the two forms 
of trust are distinct; each has its own developmental trajectories, antecedents, and relationships 
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with outcomes. However, CBT is an antecedent of ABT, particularly at the beginning of 
relationships. 
More recent work has addressed the development of unidimensional trust over time in 
teams (e.g., Jones & George, 1998). For example, Aubert & Kelsey (2003) used virtual and face-
to-face (FtF) teams to test Mayer et al.'s (1995) propositions that antecedents of trust would 
change over time. They found no evidence that integrity is more important than benevolence 
during the beginning stages of relationships nor that the effect of benevolence on trust increases 
over time. Arguing that the large amount of cross-sectional research had neglected the important 
developmental aspects of trust over time (e.g., Rousseau et al., 1998) and that previous research 
failed to allow sufficient time for a two-factor (i.e., CBT and ABT) trust solution to emerge 
(Dirks, 1999; Ferrin & Dirks, 2003), Webber (2008) used semester-long student project teams in 
her study. She demonstrated that trust emerges as one factor early on during the life-span of a 
team (“early trust”), but that cognitive and affective trust later emerge as separate components, 
each with their own predictors. For example, prior team member familiarity only predicts early 
trust, presumably because team members can rely on more telling behaviors observed throughout 
the course of teamwork for later forms of trust. Although Webber (2008) found no direct 
relationship between previous reliable project performance and cognitive based trust, she did 
find that cognition-based trust was driven by an interaction of performance and early trust such 
that reliable performance only affects cognitive trust in the presence of high early trust.   
Two-dimensional trust assumes that trust relationships are multi-faceted, and thus, trust 
and distrust can be measured separately. For example, the trustor can trust the trustee in one 
setting (e.g., to engage a target), but can simultaneously distrust the same person in another 
domain (e.g., conducting surveillance). This model assumes that trust and distrust both begin at 
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low levels, and that they develop as a function of support or violations of expectations in a 
various settings and circumstances (Lewicki et al., 2006). 
Finally, the transformational approach suggests that the nature of trust itself changes over 
time. For example, Lewicki & Bunker (1995, 1996) propose that relationships begin with 
calculus-based trust (i.e., mitigating risk and maximizing benefits), progress to knowledge-based 
trust (i.e., being able to predict behavior), and if the trust relationship continues to develop 
successfully, arrive at identification-based trust (i.e., identifying with the other party). Since the 
development of a trust relationship begins with calculus-based trust, trust is initially built upon 
reputation as well as deterrents against defecting and rewards for cooperating or being 
trustworthy. Finally, although some relationships may only develop as far as the calculus-based 
or knowledge-based stages (e.g., a casual, transactive relationship with a cashier), others can 
achieve identification-based trust as a result of positive interactions, emotional bonding, and 
reliable predictions about the trustee’s behaviors and intentions. Although this conceptualization 
is attractive because it explicitly addresses the development of trust over time, it has received 
little empirical attention. 
The present study adopts the unidimensional model of trust (McAllister, 1995), which 
incorporates both elements commonly found in trust definitions – a willingness to assume risk 
and positive expectations about the behavior of others. The unidimensional approach also 
remains the most robust model of trust. In their meta-analysis of trust in leadership, Dirks & 
Ferrin (2002) found that 94% of studies were based on a unidimensional definition of trust 
(Webber, 2008) and that the measures used to assess it are the most frequently used and well-
validated trust instruments available (McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011). Although it was originally 
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developed to model interpersonal trust in dyads of managers, it generalizes well to team settings 
(e.g., Wilson et al., 2006) because it assesses trust in horizontal (i.e., peer) relationships.  
Trust development in virtual teams. There are many reasons to believe that the 
development of trust in VTs is more challenging than in FtF teams. This creates a catch-22 in 
VTs since the loose coupling of virtual team members makes trust even more critical, while 
opportunities for close relations through colocation (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) and monitoring 
are heavily restricted (Wilson et al., 2006). For example, in VTs team members often lack a 
shared social context and do not expect to work together in the future. The lack of colocation 
makes teammates less likely to be heedful of the shadow-of-the-future (Powell, 1993) and to 
appreciate the shared values and social similarities pivotal to the development of trust (Jarvenpaa 
& Leidner, 1998). As Jarvenpaa and Leidner (1998) eloquently summarize, “the heart of Handy's 
argument centers on trust and a belief that ‘trust needs touch’. Paradoxically though, only trust 
can prevent the geographical and organizational distances of global team members from 
becoming psychological distances: trust allows people to take part in risky activities that they 
cannot control or monitor and yet where they may be disappointed by the actions of others” (p. 
792).  
Multiple theories argue that CMC and FtF teams differ qualitatively in their development 
of trust. For example, Media Richness Theory (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Daft, Lengel, & Trevino, 
1987), Social Presence Theory (Short, Williams, & Christie, 1976), and Time, Interaction, and 
Performance Theory (TIP; Mcgrath, 1991) all broadly argue that not all communication 
mediums are created equal.  Leaner communication technologies (e.g., chat client) convey less 
social information than richer mediums (e.g., videoconferencing, face-to-face communication). 
Since the technology channels used by distributed teams constrict the bandwidth for the 
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communication of pivotal social cues that reveal intention such as facial expressions, vocal 
inflections, gestures, warmth, attentiveness, and physical appearance, trust development in CMC 
teams will be stunted relative to FtF teams. Finally, Cues-Filtered-Out Theory also argues that 
the decreased amount of social context cues in CMC teams makes trust development in these 
teams qualitatively different than in FtF teams, such that FtF teams demonstrate higher levels of 
trust than CMC teams (Culnan & Markus, 1987; Rousseau et al., 1998; Wilson et al., 2006). 
Lean communication technology thus leads to a paucity of non-verbal feedback cues, which in 
turn results in deindividualization and difficulty in developing close personal relationships with 
less salient/aware communication partners. For instance, Connolly, Jessup, and Valacich (1990) 
found that CMC group communication was more task-oriented and less personal than FtF team 
interaction. In summary, these theories question the prospect of relationship development, and as 
a corollary, trust development in VTs. 
Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer (1996) explored how it is that temporary face-to-face 
teams (e.g., film crews, flight crews) develop trust. Since these teams have limited lifespans, 
there isn’t much time to build relationships, yet the people still need to rely on one another to 
accomplish common tasks. He claimed that temporary teams develop “swift trust”, which is 
initially based on positive stereotypes and is subsequently maintained through a "highly active, 
proactive, enthusiastic, generative style of action" (Meyerson et al., 1996, p. 180). That is, swift 
trust is based less on interpersonal trust and more first on imported, category-driven social 
information and subsequently on performance. This supports Lea and Spears' (1992) Social 
Identification/Deindividuation Theory (SIDE), which suggests that in the absence of 
individuating information, as is the case in lean communication mediums, people rely on 
categorical in-group/out-group impressions.  
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Jarvenpaa and Leidner (1998) studied swift trust in virtual teams. He found that first 
impressions are crucial and that few teams who started off with low trust ever developed to high 
trust. However, he also found that initial trust levels are not only imported as suggested by 
Meyerson et al. (1996), but are also dependent on early outgoing and incoming communication 
behaviors, which demonstrate task commitment and enthusiasm. Communication conveying 
support for the project and tasks serves to maintain trust, and social communication not at the 
expense of task-related communication serves to enhance trust. Jarvenpaa and Leidner's (1998) 
research thus suggests that swift trust development is not as depersonalized as Meyerson et al. 
(1996) proposed. While this study did not directly compare face-to-face and virtual teams, 
Jarvenpaa & Leidner's (1998) findings are important because they demonstrate that individuating 
information can be communicated very early on in the presence of an extremely lean medium 
(i.e., email) and that this social cue information is critical for trust formation. This data is 
therefore less consistent with the stereotype accounts of Lea & Spears' (1992) SIDE and 
Meyerson et al.'s (1996) swift trust, but is instead more consistent with Mcgrath's (1991) TIP 
where factors such as member-support (i.e., relational links between members) and group well-
being (e.g., links between member and the rest of the group) are important for ad-hoc teams with 
no shared history. 
Unlike the previous approaches, Social Information Processing Theory (SIP) argues that 
the differences between trust development in virtual and face-to-face teams are a matter of 
quantity rather than quality. Specifically, time is a conduit for social information (Harrison, 
Price, Gavin, & Florey, 2002 in Wilson et al., 2006) and given sufficient time, distributed 
teammates come to trust one another in the same way FtF teammates do. While SIP 
acknowledges that technology can retard the rate of social information exchange, the theory 
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assumes that people are uniformly driven to develop social relationships regardless of the 
communication medium. Thus, team members will still “test their assumptions about others over 
time, refine their impressions, and adjust their relational communication…[but] computer-
mediated groups can take up to four times as long to exchange the same number of messages as 
face-to-face groups” (Wilson et al., 2006, p. 19). Since a majority of research comparing CMC to 
FtF teams is cross-sectional, Wilson et al. (2006) explored the development of trust in both types 
of undergraduate teams over a 3-week period. Indeed, he found that early measurements of 
cognitive and affective trust supported a Cues-Filtered-Out account (i.e., CMC teams had lower 
levels of both types of trust), but that time neutralized the effects of the communication medium 
such that the CMC teams eventually caught up in trust with the FtF teams. Finally, Chidambaram 
(1996) also found that the relational distance among virtual team members dissipated to face-to-
face levels when virtual teams were given sufficient time to collaborate.  
Trust and performance. Trust is an important determinant of effectiveness. McAllister 
(1995) invited readers to consider trust as a lubricant in the social system. Rather than discussing 
the smooth functioning of a team, this metaphor becomes particularly effective when you 
consider the friction in a distrusting, “un-lubricated” system. When team members lack trust in 
one another, they ineffectively employ their resources. The added costs of distrust take various 
forms such as monitoring, defensive behavior, documenting problems, and re-doing work. It is 
this misdirected use of time and effort which ultimately negatively impacts both team 
performance and satisfaction (i.e., effectiveness; Costa, 2003) since team members are not 
focusing their resources on primary goals and tasks. Additionally, team members may withhold 
information from one another and thus compromise team learning or may refuse to work with 
one another on subsequent tasks (Wilson et al., 2006).   
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While a few studies have found no relationship between trust and performance, an 
overwhelming majority of studies have demonstrated that team trust is positively related to 
performance. In a longitudinal study of virtual team trust and performance, Aubert & Kelsey 
(2003) found that trust and performance were unrelated. Dirks (1999) and Porter and Lilly 
(1996) also found no relationship between trust in team members and team performance. On the 
other hand, many studies have found that trust is important for effectiveness (e.g., Costa, 2003; 
Costa, Roe, & Taillieu, 2001; Dirks, 2000; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998; 
Klimoski & Karol, 1976; Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Smith & 
Barclay, 1997; Webber, 2008). In a 2001 meta-analysis, Dirks & Ferrin summarized many 
studies examining the trust-effectiveness relationship. They not only confirmed that trust is 
positively related to team performance and satisfaction, but also found positive effects of trust on 
organizational citizenship behavior and communication as well as negative effects on conflict 
and competitive behavior. Although the above studies focused on the trust ! performance 
relationship, it is also important to note that several studies have demonstrated a positive 
relationship in the opposite direction (i.e., performance ! trust; e.g., Aubert & Kelsey, 2003; 
Webber, 2008). Additionally, prior task-oriented communication performance is a predictor of 
team trust as demonstrated in two longitudinal studies by Jarvenpaa and Leidner (1998) and 
Rico, Alcover, Sanchez-Manzanares, and Gil (2009).  
 Finally, it is important to note that the Input-Process-Output framework (Hackman & 
Morris, 1975) is merely a snapshot in time (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001). Teams typically 
work through performance episodes, which are “distinguishable periods of time over which 
performance accrues and is reviewed” (Mathieu & Button, 1992, p. 1759) and separated by goals 
and goal accomplishment (Marks et al., 2001). Therefore, teams will iterate through the IPO 
 26 
framework multiple times during their lifecycle. While it is unlikely that ad-hoc virtual team 
members are familiar with one another’s performance capabilities or histories when forming 
initial perceptions, the development of trust will certainly be impacted by performance as 
teammates cycle through performance episodes.  
 Trust and team monitoring. In this study of collaborative critical thinking, team trust is 
considered an essential input and team monitoring, a critical team process, when team 
functioning is framed using Hackman & Morris' (1975) IPO model. Team process is defined as 
“members' interdependent acts that convert inputs to outcomes through cognitive, verbal, and 
behavioral activities directed toward organizing taskwork to achieve collective goals” (Marks et 
al., 2001, p. 357). In light of the fact that team processes mediate between team inputs and 
outputs and therefore play an important role in team performance, Marks et al. (2001) created a 
useful taxonomy of team processes with three broad categories – transition phase processes, 
action phase processes, and interpersonal processes. In transition phase processes, teams evaluate 
and plan activities to guide their goal attainment (e.g., goal specification and refinement, mission 
analysis, strategy formulation); these activities typically take place between performance 
episodes. During action phase processes team members coordinate, monitor, and backup 
teammates while tracking systems and progress towards goals; this is the time during which 
teams engage in activities directly related to goal attainment (i.e., during performance episodes). 
Finally, interpersonal processes take place during both action and transition phases. In these 
processes, teammates manage conflict, affect, confidence, and motivation – all important 
predictors of the success of other processes.  
 Defining team monitoring. Monitoring is an action-phase process that teammates employ 
during performance episodes (De Jong & Elfring, 2010). Marks & Panzer (2004) as well as 
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Dickinson and McIntyre (1997) define team monitoring as, “primarily a cognitive operation in 
which team members observe actions of their teammates and watch for errors or performance 
discrepancies”. Monitoring, however, has a “two-faced” nature (Bijlsma-Frankema, de Jong, & 
van de Bunt, 2008). Extant literature differentiates between two types of monitoring, control-
based monitoring (CBM; Costa et al., 2001; McAllister, 1995) and need-based monitoring 
(NBM; McAllister, 1995). Although the behaviors associated with each type of monitoring are 
similar, the two conceptions are driven by diametrical relationships with trust.  
 Negative, control-based monitoring. Control-based monitoring is associated with 
interpersonal distrust (Zand, 1972). In McAllister's (1995) model of trust, perceptions of 
trustworthiness translate into two basic types of trust behaviors. Cooperative behavior is the 
result of perceptions of trustworthiness while monitoring behaviors are indicative of distrust. 
Control-based monitoring is thus an omen of distrust; those who cannot be relied upon to handle 
their respective tasks need to be monitored (McAllister, 1995). Suspicious teammates surveil 
their colleagues to “make sure” that they are performing appropriately. This form of negative 
monitoring can be experienced as control by those being monitored, which in turn, breeds more 
distrust in the system (Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2008; Langfred, 2004). 
 Multiple lines of research have focused on negative monitoring. While Fransen, 
Kirschner, and Erkens (2011) found no effect of trust on performance monitoring, the studies of 
Costa and her colleagues have repeatedly demonstrated an inverse relationship between trust and 
monitoring (Costa et al., 2001; Costa, 2003; Costa & Anderson, 2011) such that if monitoring is 
perceived as control, then team performance suffers since monitoring is a signal of distrust. 
These studies, however, repeatedly operationalize monitoring exclusively as a negative, 
distrusting, surveillance process and fail to leave room for reporting positive monitoring activity 
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as described below. Langfred (2004) found that high trust in teams may preclude monitoring 
activity, despite the little-contested notion that monitoring supports team performance. If highly 
cohesive and trusting teams perceive that monitoring is a sign of distrust, then social pressures to 
maintain group harmony may dissuade team members from recommending monitoring. 
However, the apprehension to endorse monitoring is less prevalent in teams with low levels of 
trust since social sanctions are less costly and the threshold for perceiving a violation of trust is 
significantly higher. High trust teams thus establish a norm of non-monitoring while teams in 
which colleagues are perceived as untrustworthy freely monitor one another (Bijlsma-Frankema 
et al., 2008; Langfred, 2004). As a result, performance suffers in those teams in which high 
autonomy combines with high trust and low monitoring (Langfred, 2004).  
 Positive, need-based monitoring. Unlike control-based monitoring, need-based monitoring 
(NBM; McAllister, 1995), also known as mutual performance monitoring (MPM; Salas, Sims, & 
Burke, 2005), is associated with trust among teammates. McAllister (1995) explains that positive 
monitoring is characteristic of communal relationships and is driven by affect-based trust, team 
members’ sensitivities to one another’s needs, and teammates taken on one another’s problems 
as their own. Salas (2005) explicitly defines mutual performance monitoring as, “the ability to 
develop common understandings of the team environment and apply appropriate task strategies 
to accurately monitor teammate performance” (p. 560). Mutual performance monitoring is 
considered a sign of caring about the progress of others such that teammates can recognize when 
others are struggling. Teammates can then offer relevant assistance to improve fellow 
teammates’ performance (Marks & Panzer, 2004). This form of monitoring is “enhanced by a 
deep and affective form of trust” (De Jong & Elfring, 2010) wherein teammates perceive that 
their colleagues are looking out for them and providing necessary, appreciated assistance, rather 
 29 
than trying to control them. Trust therefore orients teammates towards the needs and goals of 
others, this is reciprocated, and teammates are willing to help one another with performance 
demands. Thus, trust and a shared team mental model are prerequisites for high quality mutual 
performance monitoring (Salas et al., 2005). 
 Several studies have demonstrated that trust is positively related to monitoring. For 
example, Bijlsma-Frankema et al. (2008) and De Jong and Elfring (2010) both found that trust 
has a positive effect on monitoring, and that monitoring mediates the positive relationship 
between trust and performance in teams of tax consultants and students, respectively. In a 
longitudinal study, Yee et al. (2010) found that cooperative (i.e., trusting) behaviors decreased as 
monitoring (i.e., distrusting) behaviors increased in a military peacekeeping simulation as 
teammates moved from training missions to performance missions. This result is surprising in 
light of the notion that teammates should increasingly trust one another as they become more 
mutually proficient in the domain and get to know one another through interaction. However, 
task- and context-transfer from the training- to the mission-phase created uncertainty, which can 
be managed by teammates through mutual performance monitoring (i.e., trusting, positive 
monitoring). While the operationalization of monitoring in this study did not explicitly 
differentiate between negative CBM and positive MPM, it is likely the case that monitoring was 
associated with perceptions of support rather than control. Positive monitoring is especially 
important for team performance under stressful, uncertain conditions since teammates can catch 
one another’s mistakes, lapses, and slips in order to provide their teammates with mission 
support. Martins et al. (2004), however, points out that monitoring and feedback may be 
challenging in virtual teams using lean communication channels because high levels of virtuality 
make it difficult to be aware of a teammate’s progress. Finally, performance monitoring must 
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become an accepted norm, even under trusting teams, if it is to be effective at boosting team 
performance (Salas et al., 2005).  
 Monitoring and performance. While there is appreciable debate whether team trust is 
positively or negatively related to monitoring behavior, it is clear that performance monitoring is 
ultimately a critical determinant of team performance. In multiple studies, monitoring has been 
shown to positively affect performance (e.g., Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2008; De Jong & Elfring, 
2010; Fransen et al., 2011; Yee et al., 2010). According to Langfred (2004), monitoring in self-
managing teams is good and necessary. It can reduce process loss because awareness of 
teammates’ activities can allow for better team coordination and situational awareness (e.g., 
being aware of others’ actions, timing, and resources; Salas et al., 2005). Additionally, 
monitoring should reduce detrimental group effects such as free riding and social loafing 
(Langfred, 2004).  
Lack of effective monitoring can lead to mission failure, which carries consequences for 
the entire team. This point is particularly salient when considering interdependent teams 
operating in dynamic, uncertain environments. In these scenarios, the failure of a single member 
constitutes the failure of the entire team. Since one of the main tenets of trust is the licensing of 
personal risk to other parties, it is particularly important that monitoring become a team-level 
activity because personal risk is inextricably linked with whole-team outcomes. As Langfred 
(2004) admonishes, high levels of individual autonomy should be accompanied by high levels of 
monitoring since poor monitoring will lead to decrements in performance. 
 The positive relationship between mutual performance monitoring and team effectiveness 
is mediated by backup behaviors. That is, teammates monitor their colleagues to detect when 
they are in need of assistance, and in turn, to facilitate corrective actions (Marks & Panzer, 
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2004). While, team monitoring and backup behaviors were previously considered a single 
construct consisting of observing teammates and being sensitive to performance discrepancies 
(i.e., monitoring) as well as providing feedback and assistance to those in need (i.e., backup), 
they have been separated in recent treatments (Marks & Panzer, 2004; Salas et al., 2005). Salas 
et al. (2005) defines backup behaviors as the “ability to anticipate other team members’ needs 
through accurate knowledge about their responsibilities. This includes the ability to shift 
workload among members to achieve balance during high periods of workload or pressure.” For 
example, teammates can either provide verbal feedback (i.e., coaching) to enable the struggling 
team member to self-correct (Salas et al., 2005) or they can physically assist a team member to 
ensure that all aspects of the team task are completed successfully. 
Decision-Making 
Individuals and teams need to make important decisions in order to accomplish their 
goals. Decision-making is the cognitive process of making a decision, of choosing a single 
option from among a set of alternatives (Hastie, 2001). Decision-making is an immense field 
with contributions from many disciplines including business, artificial intelligence, medicine, 
and psychology, among others. Below I discuss several decision-making strategies at multiple 
levels, which are particularly relevant to collaborative critical thinking. In particular, I focus my 
discussion on decision-making errors because they are useful in elucidating normal decision-
making processes. I broadly follow Duffy's (1993) framework, which proposes that biases and 
errors in team decision-making stem from one of three sources – cognitive, organizational, and 
social. Cognitive biases stem from individual limitations in information processing, and thus 
reliance on over-simplified cognitive shortcuts (i.e., heuristics). Organizational biases occur as a 
result of decisions and policies implemented at higher levels of the organization (e.g., defaults, 
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culture, structure, management, work design, resources). While organizational factors are 
important, I do not discuss them further because they are of marginal significance for the present 
study. Finally, bias and error also come from a team’s social interactions (e.g., social 
influence/group biases, social projection). 
Models of decision-making. Decision-making theories can be broadly categorized into 
two types, descriptive and normative. Descriptive approaches to decision-making explain how 
people actually make decisions, whereas normative models describe how decisions should be 
made (Edwards & Fasolo, 2001). While below I mostly explain principles of descriptive 
decision-making, it is also important to describe normative decision-making models and why 
they are inappropriate for team decision-making in complex, dynamic, and uncertain 
environments. 
Normative decision-making tools are mathematical models designed to quantify the 
“best” option. Edwards & Fasolo (2001) summarize three normative rules – multi-attribute utility 
measurement (MAU), Bayes’ theorem of probability (Bayes), and maximization of subjectively 
expected utility (Max SEU). Although an explanation of the specific mathematical principles 
underlying each of these decision tools is outside the scope of this review, it is important to 
consider the purpose of each and the requisite conditions that can make this collection of tools 
effective. These tools rely on a payoff matrix, which is composed of options (these are under the 
decision-maker’s control) and states (conditions in the world not under the decision-maker’s 
control), and outcomes. MAU is a tool to determine utilities for each outcome, or the subjective 
value/payoff for each option-state combination. Another important step in normative decision-
making is to enumerate and determine the probabilities of all possible states. However, given the 
inherent uncertainty in the world, it is difficult to determine what all the possible states are, let 
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alone their probabilities. The process of gathering evidence to assess probabilities in order to 
make an “inference under uncertainty” is the domain of Bayes’ theorem, which uses evidence 
such as prior and posterior probabilities and expected losses to make single decisions or a 
Markov process for dynamic, ongoing decision-making. Finally, an optimization rule, such as 
Max SEU, is applied to the combination of utilities and state probabilities to make a decision.  
A purely normative (i.e., traditional) decision-making strategy, however, is difficult to 
apply because many of the decision-making steps rely on human input, which is often subject to 
biases and limitations. For example, a normative approach requires the enumeration of all 
available options as a first step (Edwards & Fasolo, 2001). However, it is often very difficult for 
humans to generate an exhaustive list of options, especially in a complex, uncertain, and rapidly 
changing environments. Additionally, the “traditional” approaches are very computationally 
intensive and thus hard for humans to process. As Patel, Kaufman, and Arocha (2002) attest, “By 
the late 1960s, psychologists had amassed a considerable body of research documenting 
numerous decision-making and reasoning anomalies in individuals. It was apparent that people 
are not skilled Bayesians and that their probability judgments deviated from the normative 
standards in systematic ways…such models are not readily applicable if the decision must be 
made under the kind of constraints (e.g., stress, time pressure, and limited resources) found in 
many natural settings. It is apparent that we need a better understanding of the process of 
decision-making in real-world situations.” (p. 55, 60). In summary, the classical decision-making 
approach is brittle and has poor ecological validity. I discuss a selection of these systematic 
deviations (i.e., heuristics and biases) and alternatives approaches (i.e., naturalistic decision-
making, critical thinking) below. 
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Cognitive biases: Individual judgment under uncertainty. Before discussing how 
teams make decisions and why it is important for them to engage in critical thinking, it is 
important to first discuss how individuals make decisions in the real world (i.e., a descriptive 
approach). Although we make many decisions unconsciously throughout the day, there are also 
times when we engage in volitional decision-making by employing a variety of simple and 
complex strategies. For example, we can make a list of pros and cons, use a randomization 
procedure (e.g., flipping a coin) to choose among alternatives, acquiesce to authority, minimax 
(minimizing losses given a worst case scenario, maximize (finding the best option available), or 
satisfice (continue examining solutions until we find one that is ‘good enough’) (Simon, 1956).  
It is also important to understand the fallibility of individual decision-making. In a 
seminal paper on decision-making under uncertainty, Tversky & Kahneman (1974) describe 
three cognitive heuristics – availability, anchoring and adjustment, representativeness – 
individuals use to assess probabilities and make predictions. Heuristics are mental models that 
serve as shortcuts to efficiently process information. Unfortunately, these shortcuts are not 
always correct and can lead to biases and critical errors in judgment. 
The availability heuristic suggests that people assume that an event is more frequent 
because particular occurrences of that event are readily available in their mind. That is, people 
assess the frequency or probability of an event based on how easily examples of that event come 
to mind. A contemporary example is home foreclosure.  Because we see so many news stories 
about home foreclosures, we might judge that the likelihood of having our own home being 
foreclosed on is high. Another availability heuristic bias is rooted in vividness (Shedler & Manis, 
1986) such that a single vivid example comes to represent a whole, rather than merely a single of 
example of the range of possibilities (e.g., skydiving accidents). Yet another related error is the 
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false consensus effect, which is the tendency to overestimate the degree of others’ agreement 
with our own opinions and beliefs. This bias is driven by the fact that our own thoughts, beliefs, 
and opinions are the ones most available to us.  
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic is employed when a person is provided with a 
value (the anchor) and subsequently estimates a value proximal to the anchor, rather than 
estimating an original value. A great example of this is the experiment by Northcraft & Neale 
(1987) using house prices.  Participants were asked to assess the value of a house while they 
were given the asking price (anchor).  Both students and realtors were subject to the anchoring 
effect since the estimated fair prices closely reflected the anchor across conditions (various 
anchor prices).  Notably, these results demonstrate that the anchoring effect is robust despite 
expert judgment (e.g., professional realtors).   
Finally, the representativeness heuristic is the process of making judgments based on how 
similar something is to a typical example, or a mental prototype. For example, the USS 
Vincennes shot down an Iranian civilian airliner in 1988, mistakenly believing that it was a 
fighter plane poised to attack the US Navy ship (Johnston, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1998). The 
cues, incorrectly perceived by decision-makers, fit into a prototypical example of an aircraft with 
hostile intent. A corollary to the representativeness heuristic is biased generalization from a 
sample to the population. For instance, if a new teammate’s is exposed first to an unhelpful 
colleague, he or she may infer that the rest of the team is similarly unhelpful.   
Social biases. Groups and teams often need to make decisions. Jones and Roelofsma 
(2000) differentiate between group and team decision-making. They claim that groups make 
specific decisions (i.e., making the decision is the task), whereas decision-making in teams is an 
embedded process subserving the performance of a broader, ongoing task (e.g., engaging 
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targets). Thus, although teams are subsets of groups, group decision-making is a subset of team 
decision-making.  
 Forsyth (2009) presents a functional model of the process groups typically use in coming to 
decisions.  In the first stage, orientation, groups define a problem, set goals, and plan a strategy. 
Next, during discussion, groups gather, exchange, and process goal-relevant information, decide 
whether a decision needs to be made, and identify and evaluate options. The group then makes a 
decision using one or multiple decision schemes. If no decision is reached, the group can go back 
to the orientation and discussion phases to reframe the problem and/or gather additional 
information. If a decision is reached, groups proceed to implement a solution. After 
implementation, groups gather feedback so that a decision can be evaluated. In this study, we 
conceive of collaborative critical thinking (discussed below) as a process that directly enhances 
the orientation and discussion phases of this model.  
Jex & Britt (2008) explain that, “Organizations make frequent use of groups for an 
obvious reason: A group can accomplish more than an individual”. This statement underscores a 
general belief that “two heads are better than one”. Forsyth (2009) adds that, “in most cases, 
groups are better at choosing, judging, estimating and problem solving than are individuals.” (p. 
315). Groups are therefore often formed with the purpose of performing a task or solving a 
problem with the intention that group processes and output will be qualitatively (e.g., more 
creative, fewer errors, can handle more complexity) and/or quantitatively (e.g., decision reached 
sooner, product created faster) better than an individual working alone. Several studies highlight 
the powerful effects of group synergy. For example, Zimbardo, Butler, and Wolfe (2003) found 
that students allowed to work in teams got better grades and were more satisfied, confident, and 
relaxed than students who took the test solo. Lazonder (2005) also found that teams were able to 
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employ more sophisticated Google search strategies and find information more frequently and 
more quickly than students searching alone. 
There are a number of intuitively appealing explanations of why group performance and 
decision-making should be better than individuals working alone. These include: 1) a belief in 
the law of large numbers, 2) the belief that the collective knowledge of the group is greater than 
the knowledge of any individual in the group, 3) the belief that groups are more creative, and 4) 
the belief that groups offer the opportunity for checks and balances.  Empirical research, 
however, has offered a number of rebuttals and qualifications for these beliefs such that groups 
can also perform more poorly and make worse decisions than the same number of individuals 
working alone (Kerr & Tindale, 2004).  
 While the law of large numbers (the more, the better) is advantageous when aggregating 
individual judgments and decisions (e.g., reduced standard error on questionnaires), large 
numbers in groups can exacerbate bias. Since systematic bias aggregates, a decision can become 
increasingly biased when adding members to a group. In a closely related phenomenon, group 
polarization, the majority position is intensified by discussion. This occurs because individuals in 
groups are exposed to more arguments supporting the majority position and therefore become 
more convinced of that position (Lamm, 1988). In risky shift, an example of polarization, groups 
tend to make riskier judgments when they come to a decision together instead of when individual 
judgments are aggregated. When individuals in the group sense the general position of the 
collective, they will shift their opinions to more closely reflect the collective, and if the position 
of the group is risky, it seems less risky because multiple people have endorsed it. Alternatively, 
cautious shift could also occur such that group decisions become more risk averse, cautious, and 
moderate than aggregated individual decisions (Jones & Roelofsma, 2000).  
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 If you consider the knowledge of the individuals in a group and add it in a serial fashion, 
the aggregate pool of knowledge will contain more information than any single individual’s pool 
of knowledge. However, when groups come together, much of this information is not shared 
because group members tend to spend their time discussing shared knowledge, rather than non-
overlapping knowledge; large numbers further exacerbate this inclination.  For example, Stasser 
and Titus' (1985) study demonstrates that unshared information is not adequately distributed in 
groups, which leads to poor applicant selection. 
Groups can evoke deeper information processing since discussions prompt additional 
questions and the generation of alternatives. Furthermore, group members can cross-cue one 
another’s memory stores, and thus enhance recall. However, when gathering groups of people to 
generate ideas, research shows that brainstorming groups do worse than nominal groups (i.e., 
members working individually and then aggregating their results). Instead of productively 
generating new ideas, people working in brainstorming groups tend to suffer from production 
blocking (the cognitive inability of a group member to both generate new ideas and listen to 
other group members, mental overload), social loafing (the reduction of effort when working in a 
group vs. when working individually), and evaluation apprehension (a fear of receiving negative 
criticism regarding contributions made to the group discussion) (Forsyth, 2009). 
 There is also belief that group members can elaborate on and critique one another’s ideas 
so that bad ideas will be eliminated and good ideas will be refined. Several biases can stand in 
the way of such a “checks and balances” system. For instance, the false consensus effect is a 
tendency to overestimate the amount of similarity between self and others such that a person 
estimates that others are more supportive of his or her position than they really are (i.e., seeing 
own behavior as typical) (Ross, 1977). When teams are working in uncertain conditions, this bias 
 39 
can be dangerous because team members may assume that their teammates are interpreting 
ambiguous information the same way they are (Jones & Roelofsma, 2000). Another phenomenon 
that can result in poor decision-making is group escalation of commitment (Bazerman, 1994), 
which describes a group’s tendency to continue supporting a decision or course of action despite 
evidence that it is ineffective (i.e., in opposition to a rational decision-making model). Group 
leaders, who desire to be seen as consistent, need to be particularly heedful of this bias (Jones & 
Roelofsma, 2000). Furthermore, when groups find themselves in competitive circumstances 
(e.g., combat), they need to be cautious that escalation does not end up hurting the group more 
than abandoning a strategy (e.g., bidding wars, unnecessary casualties). Lastly, groups are 
subject to the groupthink phenomenon wherein a cohesive group values and strives for 
uniformity (Janis, 1972), which overrides the tenets of good decision-making (e.g., open 
mindedness, uncensored discussion, individual evaluation of ideas). This can be hazardous for 
group decision-making because groups may fail to realistically and comprehensively consider all 
alternative courses of action.  
Finally, collaboration creates problems that don’t otherwise exist in groups that aggregate 
their work nominally. For example, collaboration creates meta-work, and members must spend 
their time doing non-task maintenance. For example, group members must communicate, sort 
out issues of rank and power/status, resolve conflicting goals, build cohesiveness, and enforce 
group norms. This time and effort can be alternatively spent by individuals actually doing task-
related work (Forsyth, 2009).  
 Evaluating and choosing among alternatives. Decision-making in the face of a complex 
array of potential solutions and contingencies can be a daunting task, but ultimately, groups need 
to make a single decision (Hastie & Kameda, 2005). During the orientation phase, groups can 
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decide which social decision scheme they will use to converge on a single decision. For example, 
groups can delegate the choice to an individual (e.g., an authority figure), a subgroup (e.g., 
oligarchy, delegation), or an external party (e.g., outside expert). In averaging, group members 
rank decision choices nominally. Individual decisions are then combined to converge on an 
average solution. In plurality schemes, individual decisions are combined and a majority, or 
perhaps a more substantial plurality requirement, determine the decision. If groups use a 
unanimous decision strategy, then they continue discussion until a full consensus is reached (e.g., 
juries). Finally, a group can also leave a decision to chance by using, for example, a random 
number generator. Each of these strategies has cultural and practical implications (see Forsyth, 
2009 for a discussion).  
 Structured processes and computerized decision support systems can be used to assist 
decision-making. These processes and techniques are designed to help individuals and groups 
overcome some of the decision-making constraints discussed in the previous section (e.g., 
cognitive and social biases, limited Bayesian inference, information overload). Although I only 
review a limited sample of classic and contemporary decision support processes and 
computerized systems, literally hundreds have been developed to reinforce various phases of 
decision-making such as orientation, discussion, decision generation, and decision selection 
(Forsyth, 2009).  
 The Delphi method is a structured communication technique used in groups for “the 
systematic solicitation and collation of judgments on a particular topic through a set of carefully 
designed sequential questionnaires interspersed with summarized information and feedback of 
opinions derived from earlier responses” (Delbecq, van de Ven, & Gustafson, 1975, p. 10). This 
technique is designed to overcome social biases that occur when group members interact face-to-
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face such as conformity. As such, group members are isolated from one another, and 
communicate through iterated statistical summaries of survey probes until a stop-criterion is met 
(e.g., consensus, predetermined number of cycles). This technique also has limitations. For 
instance, group members can feel isolated, ideas can be communicated ineffectively as a result of 
poor writing skills, and it can be too time-consuming to solve ad-hoc, dynamic problems 
(Coovert & McNelis, 1992). 
 Schurink et al. (2007) developed and evaluated a modern Bayesian decision support system 
(BDSS) for diagnosing pneumonia. Given the recent transition to electronic health record, patient 
information can be mined and analyzed by a computerized decision support system to aid in 
diagnosis. This technique is particularly useful in the absence of explicit diagnostic gold-
standards. Although the study did not explicitly compare the classification performance of the 
BDSS with other methods (e.g., other statistical techniques, physicians), the study found that, 
after “training” the system, the BDSS was able to accurately predict the absence and presence of 
pneumonia when compared with a reference diagnosis. Notably, this research demonstrates that 
normative decision-making approaches can be useful when the number of states is limited (i.e., 
pneumonia present, pneumonia absent) and there is sufficient data to reliably calculate 
probabilities (e.g., posterior distributions calculated from symptomatology).  
 Finally, decision support systems can also be employed for group decision-making in 
complex, dynamic environments. Schraagen & van de Ven (2008) developed a critical thinking 
support tool for use in real-time crisis management situations. The software allows users to 
enumerate their hypotheses and subsequently color code incoming evidence as either supportive 
or contradictory. This tool helps users offload memory and prevents them from prematurely 
tunneling in on a hypothesis. Users were thus able keep more alternatives open in environments 
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where information is incomplete or ambiguous (i.e., prevent decision bias) and make better 
decisions. The authors subsequently extend this tool and develop a prototype that allows groups 
of decision-makers to visually track which changes in evidence affected which decisions; this 
helps groups build collective situational awareness.  
Naturalistic decision-making. In contrast to normative models of decision-making, the 
naturalistic decision-making (NDM) approach investigates decision-making in the “real-world” 
with the goal of understanding how humans make decisions in complex tasks and environments. 
In their seminal work on NDM, Klein, Orasanu, and Calderwood (1993) found that expert 
decision-makers relied more on recognition of familiar situations in order to make decisions, 
whereas novices turned to more deliberate decision-making strategies. Thus, recognitional 
processes rely on the experience bank of the decision-maker who is able to detect patterns as 
familiar and realize relevant responses to these patterns. NDM is thus a considerably more 
holistic and ecologically valid approach in that it considers decisions in light of other pivotal 
processes (e.g., situation awareness, problem solving, planning, expertise, communication) and 
conditions (e.g., time pressure, fatigue, stress, unreliable information) that impact decision-
making in dynamic environments (Salas & Klein, 2001). 
Individual critical thinking. Decision makers must often make choices in complex, 
dynamic, and uncertain environments. These settings are often characterized by incomplete, 
contradictory, unreliable, uninformative, and ambiguous information. While even the most 
seasoned veterans lack situational omniscience in such environments, experienced decision-
makers intentionally acknowledge imperfections by evaluating, critiquing, and refining 
assumptions (Cohen & Freeman, 1997; Cohen, Freeman, & Thompson, 1998; Cohen, Freeman, 
& Wolf, 1996). If decision-makers consciously surface deficiencies in knowledge, they can more 
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fully consider alternatives and avoid problematic decision-making heuristics such as the 
tendency seek out evidence in order to maintain an initial interpretation of an uncertain situation 
(i.e., confirmation bias) even when contradictory evidence accumulates (i.e., tunnel vision) 
(Cohen et al., 1998; Schraagen & van de Ven, 2008; van Dongen, Schraagen, Eikelboom, & te 
Brake, 2005). This process of purposeful information evaluation in order to generate more 
enlightened decisions is called critical thinking. 
Decision-making based on simple, probabilistic stimulus-response contingencies fails to 
consider the intricacy and instability of information in contemporary operating environments. 
Cohen et al. (1998) argue that Bayesian approaches for complex decision-making are insufficient 
because decision-makers often cannot exhaustively define all the relevant situational variables 
(e.g., premises, mechanisms, conclusions) necessary to derive a probability, a priori. 
Furthermore, a Bayesian approach neglects not only the rapidly evolving nature of events, but 
also fails to consider the complexity and uniqueness of the circumstances surrounding each 
decision. The pattern matching approach prompts several important questions about decision-
making: What happens when the pattern doesn’t precisely match the template? How do decision-
makers resolve conflicts between multiple equally probable templates? How do decision-makers 
generate and evaluate new/alternative templates? When should decision-makers settle on a 
template for a given pattern and when should they continue looking for a more likely template? 
(Cohen & Freeman, 1997; Cohen et al., 1998). For example, when decision-makers are faced 
with novel circumstances, such a probabilistic approach collapses because the premise-
conclusion patterns they have previously encountered may be poor prognosticators of outcomes 
in a new situation. Employees in high reliability occupations such as those found in the military, 
healthcare, and commercial aviation are often faced with complex decisions. As Flin, Slaven, 
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and Stewart (1996, p. 269) point out, “the emergency you prepare for is never the one that 
happens,” and it is precisely this level of complexity in high reliability occupations, which makes 
experience or repeated exposure a poor teacher (Baumann, Gohm, & Bonner, 2011). 
The Recognition/Metarecognition (RM) framework was developed by Cohen et al. 
(1996) as an alternative to the probabilistic (i.e., normative) models and as an extension to the 
pattern-matching approach characteristic naturalistic decision-making. The two-tiered RM 
framework suggests that accomplished decision-makers are able not only to employ the 
recognitional skills described by Klein et al. (1993) in naturalistic decision-making, but are also 
able to use metarecognitional skills to make good choices. The metarecognitional process is 
derived from the notion of metacognition (Flavell, 1976). If metacognition is, “thinking about 
thinking,” then the catchphrase for metarecognition is, “recognizing about recognizing.” This 
mechanism affords a decision-maker the opportunity to critically evaluate weaknesses in his or 
her own recognitional process by purposely dealing with gaps and flaws in knowledge, resolving 
conflicts, questioning assumptions, generating alternative explanations, and verifying results 
(i.e., “critiquing and correcting”) (Cohen et al., 1996; van Dongen et al., 2005). The 
metarecognitional component also allows decision-makers to evaluate whether the decision is 
even worth evaluating. Thus, the two tiers of the Recognition/Metarecognition framework are 
complementary such that decision-makers can use their domain experience (recognitional) in 
novel situations by “monitoring”, “mentally marking” and “annotating” weaknesses 
(metarecognitional). Finally, Cohen et al. (1996) argue that since the RM model fits best when 
decision are made in novel situations, where typical templates don’t fit observed patterns, 
metarecognition is a critical thinking process.  
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Four main processes characterize metarecognition (Cohen & Freeman, 1997; Cohen et 
al., 1998, 1996). After making observations about a situation, decision-makers build a narrative 
story or schema to organize the situation. The first process, the quick test, is a monitoring step 
intended to evaluate whether a decision-maker should even engage in critical thinking. The quick 
test asks: 1) whether the risk of delay is acceptable (i.e., Is there time to do it?), 2) whether the 
cost of an error if one acts immediately is high (i.e., Is it worth it?) and 3) whether the situation is 
non-routine/problematic (i.e., Is this a novel/uncertain situation? If not, is there an acceptable 
off-the-shelf solution?). If the benefits do outweigh the costs as determined by the quick test, 
then the decision-maker should proceed with the critiquing and correcting steps of the critical 
thinking process. First, evidence-conclusion relationships (i.e., arguments) in the story are 
identified. Second, the arguments are critiqued based on three criteria - incompleteness, conflict, 
and unreliability. Finally, an attempt is made to resolve problems found within the arguments in 
the second step. In this action phase, a decision-maker can inhibit action, collect additional data, 
shift his or her attention, adopt/drop assumptions, create contingency plans, wait for further 
situation development, or employ any other necessary corrective actions. This critical thinking is 
iterative such that critiquing and correcting one argument may reveal another. Finally, since the 
situation on the ground is complex and constantly changing, the critical thinking process must 
also be dynamic. For example, a quickly moving target may prompt a decision-maker to reapply 
the quick test and he or she may determine that there is no longer time for critical thinking, or 
perhaps a new behavior by the target will change the story the decision-maker constructs.  
The critical thinking process of “building, verifying, and modifying” can be trained using 
the STEP technique: 1) Create a Story, 2) Test for Conflict, 3) Evaluate the Story, and 4) 
Develop Contingency Plans. This training strategy was validated in multiple samples. With 
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STEP training, officers were able to notice more factors in evaluating the intent of a target, 
identify and explain more conflicting evidence, identify more underlying assumptions, and 
generate more alternate assessments. Finally, there is also evidence that critical thinking training 
makes officers more confident in their decisions, and more importantly, improves task 
performance (i.e., accuracy of assessments; Cohen et al., 1998). 
Collaborative critical thinking. Collaborative critical thinking is derived from three 
research threads: 1) individual critical thinking, 2) team process, and 3) team performance in 
information age warfare (J. Freeman & Hess, 2003). Individual critical thinking can take place in 
collaborative team settings such as cockpits (J. Freeman, Cohen, & Thompson, 1998). Freeman 
& Hess (2003) argue that an analogous process, collaborative critical thinking (CCT), can also 
take place at the team level. That is, successful teams engage in a process of constructive dissent 
by judiciously and strategically probing for disagreement within the group. Team disagreement 
can be interpreted as a symptom of, for example, disparate interpretations of cues, heterogeneity 
in hypotheses, or conflicting analyses of opportunities to engage in critical thinking. The 
collaborative critical thinking framework employs a similar process of quick-testing, critiquing, 
and correcting found in the Recognition/Metarecognition framework, which describes individual 
critical thinking (Cohen et al., 1996). The necessity and opportunity assessment to engage in 
CCT is similar to the quick-test in the RM framework. It is again important for team members to: 
1) determine whether there is time to engage in CCT, 2) to ensure that engaging in CCT is 
valuable in light of the cost of an error if the group does not engage in CCT, and 3) to ensure that 
the situation is sufficiently uncertain. However, one additional criterion is important when 
drawing an analog to the quick-test at the group level. Specifically, it is important for the group 
to engage in an assessment of disagreement. Disagreement can be measured for each of the three 
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previously mentioned components of the quick-test or for any other decision-making “artifacts” 
(e.g., cue interpretations, action plans). If sufficient disagreement exists in any of these 
components, this can signal to the team that the group can potentially benefit from collaborative 
critical thought. If the opportunity exists and the group is in disagreement per the quick-test, 
team members can proceed to critique the relevancy and accuracy of assumptions and plans held 
across the group. Specifically, a team can probe for incompleteness in information or gaps in 
knowledge, for conflict in interpretations of cues, and for unreliability information or untested 
assumptions. A team can then take corrective actions such as seeking additional information, 
developing contingency plans, or distributing previously siloed information across group 
members. These four processes are summarized in the collaborative critical thinking literature 
simply as: Monitor, Assess, Critique, Act (Freeman et al., 2003; Hess et al., 2008). Collaborative 
critical thinking is considered a success if a team can eliminate uncertainty about a situation, or 
at least illuminate uncertainty so that teams do not fall into decision-making traps such as tunnel 
vision (Schraagen & van de Ven, 2008) or immediate acceptance of pre-potent cue-response 
relationships (Hess et al., 2008). 
How CCT serves collaboration. Freeman and Hess (2003) present a collaboration model 
that specifies the: 1) factors which necessitate collaboration, 2) factors which influence the 
ability to collaborate, 3) products of collaboration, and 4) effects of collaboration on mission 
performance. According to the first parameter, collaboration isn’t always necessary. For 
example, when the nature of the mission is individual, or when one person possesses all of the 
necessary expertise and resources to accomplish the task or goal, collaboration is perhaps a 
wasteful process. If, however, expertise or resources are divided then successful collaboration 
can yield results that cannot be accomplished by a lone individual. The second parameter 
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describes a team’s ability to collaborate. This is determined in part by the technology available to 
the team (e.g., communication tools), the team’s training and skill in team processes (e.g., 
negotiation, active listening), team composition (e.g., homo-/heterogeneity of team), and the 
team’s ability to engage in collaborative critical thinking. In turn, a team’s ability directly 
predicts what the team reaps from the collaboration (e.g., solutions, plans, shared knowledge, 
shared awareness) and how the team performs on mission-relevant criterion measures. 
Alternatively, Freeman et al. (2003) frame CCT within Letsky's (2007) collaboration 
model. In this model, collaboration is a function of five interrelated processes: 1) establishing 
conventions (process knowledge), 2) developing shared understanding (domain knowledge), 3) 
developing collaborative knowledge (team knowledge), 4) attaining consensus (negotiating 
solutions), and 5) validating (testing and revising) conclusions. Within this model, CCT is a 
mechanism that bridges and refines the relationship between attaining consensus (collaboration 
process 4) and validating conclusions (collaboration process 5). The collaboration processes 
collectively predict the effects of collaboration (e.g., synchronization, communications, 
information management, workload balance) which, in turn, predict mission effects (e.g., 
Measures of Effectiveness such as kills, losses, and detections; Freeman & Serfaty, 2002). 
Finally, the model can also account for dispositional or compositional factors which can support 
or hinder collaborative critical thinking (e.g., systematic, open-minded team members). For 
example, team members who are high in agreeableness may readily dismiss conflicting 
information and not engage in critical evaluation of shared information (Ellis et al., 2003; Hess et 
al., 2008). 
Finally, Hess et al. (2008) suggest that CCT can serve all fours stages of the Warner 
collaboration model - knowledge-base construction, collaborative problem-solving, consensus, 
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outcome evaluation and revision (Warner & Wroblewski, 2004). During knowledge-base 
construction, team members identify the necessary resources (e.g., personnel, information, tools, 
team processes and structure) required to successfully collaborate and accomplish the mission.  
Warner posits that teams then need to jointly solve problems, come to consensus, act, and 
evaluate their solutions – all processes Hess et al. (2008) theorize can be directly affected by 
CCT. 
These three models are very similar and roughly follow the IPO format that characterizes 
many models of team interaction (Hackman & Morris, 1975). The IPO framework can be 
roughly consolidated for the three collaboration models as it relates to CCT specifically. The 
Inputs then are 1) a necessity to collaborate given an uncertain, complex, dynamic, and high-
stakes situation wherein resources such as expertise are distributed among team members, and 2) 
team composition/dispositional factors. The Process is characterized by the quality of the 
collaborative critical thought, and the Outputs are 1) the products of collaboration, and 2) the 
impacts on mission performance. 
Managing CCT. A team leader can oversee the entire collaborative critical thinking 
process to ensure that team resources are prioritized to address the most critical risks and 
uncertainties first. The Collaboration for Enhanced Team Reasoning (CENTER) tool is a 
decision-support system designed specifically to help team leaders facilitate collaborative critical 
thinking by measuring, monitoring, and managing team knowledge and decisions (Freeman, 
Weil, & Hess, 2006; Hess et al., 2008). CENTER allows leaders to probe individual team 
members on their beliefs regarding mission elements. For example, a team member may be 
prompted with a quick-test-related probe such as, “The team has time to critique and refine the 
plan regarding engaging the target” to which they would respond with a Likert-type rating 
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indicating their agreement or disagreement with the statement. CENTER then aggregates 
individual responses to provide mean, range, and variance information for each probe so the 
leader can determine whether team views of the mission are coherent. If, for example, the probe 
displays an average mean and high variability, CENTER will recommend, based upon this 
distribution, that the leader further probe team members and engage them in a process of 
collaborative critical thought through a chat client.      
There is good reason to believe that collaborative critical thinking, like individual critical 
thinking, can be trained and has a positive impact on performance. While no study to date has 
examined a direct relationship between CCT training and team-initiated CCT behavior, CCT 
training has been demonstrated to have a positive effect on novice team performance (Hess et al., 
2008). Using another time-pressured CCT tool similar to CENTER, Schraagen & van de Ven 
(2008) were able to demonstrate that people using the tool were able to accommodate more new 
pieces of evidence in drawing conclusions, were able to come to better conclusions, and were 
able to avoid misleading decision heuristics (e.g., confirmation bias) than those not using the 
tool. However, team members using tools such as CENTER must use critical mission time to 
code incoming evidence and to respond to prompts, which may result in mission disruption and 
unnecessary delays in decision-making. Therefore, such an explicit coordination process is likely 
too time-consuming when teams or team members are under high workload and/or time pressure. 
While good decision-makers should definitely use critical thinking to overcome decision biases, 
critical thinking tools are best relegated for training team members to use critical thinking (Hess 
et al., 2008; Schraagen & van de Ven, 2008). 
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Present Study and Hypotheses 
 So far I have discussed the landscape that has necessitated the use of teams and, in 
particular, VTs in modern civilian and military organizations. I have also defined teams and 
virtual teams and compared their relative benefits, limitations, and relationships with a variety of 
relevant predictors and outcomes such as trust development, monitoring, and effectiveness. 
Lastly, I highlighted the importance and process of making high-quality decisions in order to 
accomplish individual and collective goals. I discussed common decision-making errors 
committed during individual and group work, and featured collaborative critical thinking as a 
process of mitigating uncertainty in decision-making and enhancing team collaboration. 
 While Hess et al. (2008) found that CCT training enhanced performance in virtual teams, 
no study to date has evaluated the relationship between CCT and trust development. Since trust 
is a critical determinant of team effectiveness, finding interventions to enhance trust can help 
teams realize their full potential.  
In the present study, I investigate the effects of CCT training on virtual team 
effectiveness and the development of team trust. Since trust takes time to develop, especially in 
virtual teams, I use a longitudinal approach wherein team members iterate through multiple 
performance episodes on a simulated search-and-rescue task. The task is interdependent and the 
distribution of information creates uncertainty. It should therefore be an appropriate environment 
for team members to engage in CCT. Costa (2003) argues that multiple individual and team 
outcomes are important to measure in addition to objective performance. Although studies differ 
on what is included in this “effectiveness” package, she suggests that it is critical to assess the 
objective output of the team as well as some attitudinal components and subjective appraisals 
(e.g., impact of the group on members, attitudinal and continuance commitment, perceived task 
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performance). In this study, I define effectiveness as a combination of objective team 
performance, team viability, team cooperation, and team perceived collective efficacy. 
In the literature review above, I presented overwhelming evidence that trust predicts 
effectiveness as well as evidence that effectiveness predicts trust. I therefore assume that team 
trust and team effectiveness will influence one another such that changes in one will drive 
changes in the other over time (Pavlova, 2012). 
Hypothesis 1: Changes in team effectiveness will influence changes 
in team trust. 
Hypothesis 2: Changes in team trust will influence changes in team 
effectiveness. 
There is also good reason to believe that providing CCT training can 1) directly improve 
team effectiveness, and 2) reinforce trust within teams, which in turn can also boost 
effectiveness. With respect to the direct route, team members siloed in their own functions may 
not understand the full operational picture. For example, in complex operations, a teammate may 
not be fully aware of his or her own knowledge deficiencies. Other teammates can help highlight 
shortcomings and fill in gaps so that the team can generate a higher quality, jointly negotiated 
decision. Although monitoring for and highlighting deficiencies enhances collaboration and is 
clearly good for team outcomes, it is a risky endeavor. Tracking the work progress of others and 
working around team members can communicate distrust, which in turn can breed performance 
losses such as teammates hoarding information or wasting time on work unrelated to the focal 
task (e.g., blame discussions). It follows then that teammates who trust one another will be more 
willing to engage in CCT and reap the performance benefits thereof.  
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Hypothesis 3: Teams trained in CCT will be more effective than 
teams not trained in CCT. 
Providing team members with CCT training can also enhance trust by creating a norm of 
monitoring. CCT is a proactive process; it requires that team members regularly engage in 
purposeful communication. These intentional exchanges can create a wider highway for the 
transmission of task-related and social information, both important predictors of trust. Regularly 
engaging in discussions and probing teammates can make teammates more familiar with one 
another’s performance. In turn, teammates can mitigate distrust since they are able to predict one 
another’s behavior more reliably. Since the majority of information communicated during CCT 
will likely be task-related, cognitive trust should be particularly impacted. The development of 
cognitive trust should also contribute to the emergence of affective trust (McAllister, 1995). 
Hypothesis 4: Teams trained in CCT will engage in more positive 
monitoring and less negative monitoring than teams 
not trained in CCT. 
Hypothesis 5: Monitoring will be positively associated with 
performance in all teams. 
In its classical conception, monitoring is driven by a distrust of other team members. That 
is, the behavior originates based on attitudes towards people. Since CCT training is administered 
before participants have had a chance to form impressions of one another, it can communicate 
that monitoring is a healthy behavior necessitated by the situation (i.e., uncertainty, good 
decision-making), rather than by people attributes. CCT can therefore sanction surveillance to 
create a norm of monitoring and thus dissociate monitoring from distrust (i.e., negative 
monitoring). Furthermore, having a teammate “check in” can be a sign of commitment and of 
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care and concern for another teammate’s needs and goals, rather than a blunt mechanism for 
control. Thus, if team members can perceive monitoring as a productive behavior, this can 
further increase affective trust. 
Hypothesis 6: Teams trained in CCT will have higher levels of 
initial trust than teams not trained in CCT. 
Hypothesis 7: Trust and effectiveness will develop more rapidly in 
teams trained in CCT compared with teams not 
trained in CCT.  
Finally, individual differences can play an important role in trust development and 
performance. An individual’s dispositional propensity to trust others, for example, can predict 
initial trust levels (Costa, 2003; Mayer et al., 1995). Although Costa (2003) found that propensity 
to trust only accounted for a small amount of variance in trust, the team members in her study 
were previously acquainted with one another. In the present study, teammates are completely 
unfamiliar with one another and have little previous information upon which to make initial trust 
judgments (i.e., deidentified teammates). Propensity to trust could perhaps explain some portion 
of how team members establish initial levels of trust. It may also be the case that team members 
who are overly trusting may fail to engage in the monitoring behaviors associated with CCT. In 
the same vein, high levels of agreeableness may prevent team members from participating in the 
process of constructive dissent so important to CCT (Coovert et al., 2005). Lastly, 
conscientiousness can directly enhance team performance (English, Griffith, & Steelman, 2004) 
and also attenuate the effects of CCT training on performance. Conscientious individuals are 
planful, thorough, hard working, and strive purposefully towards goals.  
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Hypothesis 8: Propensity to trust will be associated with initial 
team trust. 
Hypothesis 9: Conscientiousness will attenuate the relationship 
between CCT training and effectiveness. 
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Chapter 2: Method 
 
Participants 
Participants were undergraduates enrolled in various Psychology courses at the 
University of South Florida. They were recruited as three-person teams using the Psychology 
Department Research Participant Pool (SONA), an online recruiting and scheduling tool. In 
exchange for participation in the study, participants were compensated with SONA points, which 
can be used for course credit.  
Data were collected from 315 participants (105 teams of 3 players). Two teams (6 
participants) were excluded from all analyses because the research team discovered that two of 
the team members knew one another as friends prior to the study. Prior friendship could translate 
to higher levels of initial trust and thus lead to unequal experimental conditions. Five more 
participants were excluded from behavioral analyses (i.e., those involving self-reports of trust, 
team effectiveness, and team monitoring) due to technical glitches in the survey collection 
system. These participants were deleted listwise because nearly all of their responses were 
missing. With the exception of these five participants, the rest of the behavioral dataset was 
complete because the survey collection software required participants to enter a response for 
every item before they could move on. Four teams (12 participants) were excluded from any 
analyses involving DDD objective scenario scores due to technical glitches where the DDD 
system did not record the scores. After these exclusions, there remained 304 participants (Mean 
age = 20.3, SD = 3.1; 68% female). Approximately half of the participants were Causasian, 20% 
Hispanic, 13% Black/African American, 6% Asian/Pacific Islander, and 7% other/multi-racial. 
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Teams were randomly assigned to either the CCT training condition or the control condition 
(SURVIVAL). 150 participants were part of a team that received CCT training and 154 received 
the control training. No statistically significant differences were found in comparing the groups 
on any demographic variables.  
Task 
While CCT is an activity best engaged in by experienced domain experts (Hess et al., 
2008), a computer simulation was chosen as the platform for evoking CCT, trust, and 
performance because all participants were equally unfamiliar with this task. This eliminated the 
possibility of unequal prior practice, which is important in a controlled laboratory study. 
Four computers were be used to run the Distributed Dynamic Decision-making (DDD, 
Version 4.2) Antarctic Search and Rescue simulation (Aptima Inc., Woburn, Massachusetts). 
This task has been used in a variety of other team studies (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2002; Ellis et al., 
2003). This is an interdependent task, which requires team members to collaborate in order to 
accomplish a variety of objectives in three different scenarios. The team operates out of an 
Antarctic research base (Station Blue) using Snowcat vehicles to accomplish their goals. Each of 
the three scenarios has a medical, repair, and recovery objective.  The medical objective is to 
find a lost team, render medical aid, and get them back to Station Blue. The repair objective is to 
find an antenna and install it. The recover objective varies across scenarios. In Scenario 1 
(Appendix A), the team must find an unmanned aerial vehicle. In Scenario 2 (Appendix B), the 
team must find a gondola, and in Scenario 3 (Appendix C), a downed satellite. The scenarios 
were developed such that difficulty is held constant across scenarios, but the geographic 
locations of the various targets (e.g., sensors, lost party, UAV, satellite) differ. Team members 
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completed a training mission followed by three separate 30-minute missions. The order of 
scenarios was counterbalanced across teams. 
There were three roles for team members to occupy. Each team member operated a 
separate search-and-rescue Snowcat (Red, Green, and Purple) in order to complete the team’s 
tasks. The Snowcats are equipped with 1) communication equipment (text-based chat), 2) 
navigational equipment that allows the operator to see where he/she is in the terrain and steer the 
Snowcat, and 3) sensors and probes that can process and read the seismic monitors installed 
throughout the harsh landscape, which should have recorded the vibrations of the lost rescue 
party’s Snowcats driving past them. Navigating the terrain, processing the seismic monitors, and 
completing other subtasks utilizes a set of finite resources in the form of fuel, medics, 
technicians, scouts, and mechanics. These personnel are loaded onto the Snowcat, transported, 
and deployed throughout the mission. Each resource has an allotment of usable “abilities”. For 
example, if the medic has 10 abilities and a subtask requires 3 medical abilities, the Snowcat is 
left with 7 usable medic abilities. The task was calibrated such that there are sufficient resources 
available to complete all of the tasks. However, individual team members will often run out of 
resources and must rely on and coordinate with others to contribute resources in order to gather 
information and complete tasks. Each team member initially receives the same amount of 
resources, and resources are the same across the three scenarios. Additionally, team members 
must share information about the clues they find individually with other team members so that 
the team can accomplish its collective mission.  
A confederate research assistant served as “headquarters”(Blue) at the basecamp to 
provide access to the backup supply and fuel resources, but only when the other team members 
explicitly requested them. Again, while there is a sufficient amount of resources to complete all 
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of the tasks, the supply, including the backup resources controlled by Blue, is finite (e.g., fuel 
supplies can run out). Team members must therefore be cognizant and strategic about deploying 
resources. Participants were also instructed to direct any questions they have during the task to 
Blue, so that a research assistant can render technical assistance. Given the minimal role of Blue, 
mission scores are calculated only on the performance of the Red, Green, and Purple team 
members. Finally, all team members were able to communicate with one another through a text-
based chat client embedded within the DDD system. 
Training 
All training materials are derived from the training developed by Aptima, Inc. (Woburn, 
MA). For a thorough explanation of the technical details regarding the development and content 
of the CCT and control group training, see the technical report by Hess et al (2006). 
Collaborative critical thinking training (CCT). If virtual teams are temporally, 
geographically, or organizationally distributed, then it is unlikely that such teams will have an 
opportunity to train how to collaboratively critically think in a face-to-face environment. Thus, 
CCT training was delivered virtually via a narrated Powerpoint presentation. Participants were 
given a short quiz (Appendix D) after the training to ensure that they were paying attention and 
understood the concepts presented in the training. The training explains what CCT is and why it 
is important. It consists of descriptions, examples, and exercises regarding components of CCT 
including common individual and group decision-making traps (heuristics, biases, schemas, 
group process losses), and critical thinking principles (e.g., monitoring, assessing, critiquing and 
acting on information conflict, unreliability, and incompleteness under uncertainty).  
Control group training. Control group participants were also trained virtually using a 
Powerpoint presentation. Participants in this condition received S.U.R.V.I.V.A.L. training, which 
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presents an acronym-based mnemonic for employing life-saving actions in uncertain 
environments or situations (e.g., keeping mentally calm, decision making). Following the 
training, participants applied these eight principles in a written survival exercise. Participants 
were be presented with a hypothetical disaster scenario during which their tour bus is hijacked 
while traveling through a jungle in a foreign country. They were tasked with developing a short 
safety and survival plan based on a limited list of materials available from the tour bus and the 
natural environment (Appendix E). This training has good face validity in light of the Antarctic 
Search and Rescue simulation, which features uncertainty in a harsh environment with limited 
resources. It, however, does not explicitly train behaviors related to CCT. 
Measures 
All survey measures were administered using a computerized survey tool. Participants 
used a six-point Likert-type scale (1 = Completely Disagree, 2 = Mostly Disagree, 3 = Slightly 
Disagree, 4 = Slightly Agree, 5 = Mostly Agree, 6 = Completely Agree) to indicate their 
endorsement of items on all scales except for the background and personality questionnaires. 
Items from any scales administered at the same point in time were intermingled to minimize the 
potential of demand characteristics and to maximize the probability that participants read 
individual items carefully. 
Background. (Appendix F). This questionnaire assessed sample demographics (age, 
race/ethnicity, gender), education (class rank, major), employment (hours worked per week), 
team experience (frequency of working on teams, team-related training), and military experience.  
Personality. (Appendix G). The trust facet of agreeableness (10 items) and 
conscientiousness (10 items) were measured using items from the International Personality 
Inventory Pool (IPIP) (Goldberg, 1999; Goldberg et al., 2006). These items are modeled on the 
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personality constructs measured by the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Participants used a 
five-point Likert-type scale to respond (1 = Very Inaccurate to 5 = Very Accurate).  
Trust. (Appendix H). McAllister’s (1995) trust measure was adapted to be team- rather 
than individual-referent. Five items assessed cognition-based trust. One item (“Most people, 
even those who aren’t close friends of this individual, trust and respect him/her at work”) was 
deleted from the original scale because it assesses reputation; since participants had no 
knowledge of one another prior to participating in this study, this item is not applicable. Affect-
based trust was assessed using all five items found in the original measure, although the language 
was slightly modified to reflect teams rather than individuals. 
Monitoring. (Appendix I). Need-based monitoring, also known as positive or mutual 
performance monitoring, was measured using a three-item scale. Two items come from 
McAllister’s (1995) need-based monitoring scale, while a third item was generated for the 
purposes of this study (“I monitor my teammates because it’s part of what a good teammate 
does”). Control-based monitoring, also known as negative monitoring, was measured with a 
seven-item scale combining three items from McCallister’s (1995) monitoring and defensive 
behaviors scale and four items from De Jong and Elfring’s (2010) monitoring scale, which itself 
was based on Costa (2003) and Langfred (2004). 
Team effectiveness. 
Objective team performance. The DDD system automatically kept track of team member 
performance as they accomplished subtasks and major goals. For example, finding the lost 
rescue team or the unmanned aerial vehicle was worth 300 points, assisting with repair or 
medical requests earned the participant 50 points, and processing a seismic monitor was worth 
 62 
10-80 points. Once an objective was processed, points were assigned to the team member who 
processed the task and the task was made inactive.  
Team viability. (Appendix J). This scale was composed of three items assessing a 
teammate’s desire to continue being a part of the team, a proxy for team satisfaction. This 
measure was composed of one item from the Sinclair (2003) team viability scale and two items 
from the Lancellotti & Boyd (2008) team satisfaction scale. Although Lancelotti and Boyd 
(2008) labeled their questionnaire “team satisfaction,” the items actually assess team viability 
(e.g., “I would be willing to work with this team on another project”). 
Team cooperation. (Appendix K). A five-item scale developed by Conway et al. (2012) 
measured the extent to which teammate interactions were harmonious. An example item is “I 
feel like everyone in the team is working towards the group’s goals.” 
Team efficacy. (Appendix L) Perceived collective efficacy was assessed using four items 
from the Perceived Collective Efficacy assessment used in work groups in Salanova, Llorens, 
Cifre, Martinez, and Schaufeli (2003). This scale assesses the degree to which team members 
believe in their team’s competence and success. A sample item is: “My group is able to solve 
difficult tasks if we invest the necessary effort.” 
Procedure 
Face-to-face interaction can preempt trust development outside of the constraints of the 
experimental task. It was therefore important to carefully control and minimize pre-study 
participant interactions in order to ensure that all participants had the same opportunities to 
communicate and develop trust. Participants were escorted as soon as they arrived at the 
laboratory to separate simulation rooms. Doors to these rooms were closed during the study, 
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except for when researchers needed to provide instructions, answer questions, or set something 
up on the computer. 
 Upon arrival, participants were provided an explanation of the study and signed the 
consent form. Following consent, participants were familiarized with the DDD simulation 
environment and task. Participants watched a short video that included a narrative about the 
background of the mission, a briefing about their tasks and goals, and instructions for using the 
DDD system (e.g., Snowcat navigation, deploying resources, reading sensors, communicating 
with other teammates). Participants then took part in a training mission to allow them to practice 
until they were proficient with the DDD system controls (~20 minutes). Participants were 
provided with two printed documents, which they could use for reference during the missions. 
These were: 1) a DDD Map and Actions Quick Guide (Appendix M) that was used to remind 
team members about how to use the DDD interface, and 2) a Tasks and Team Structure Quick 
Guide (Appendix N) explaining team structure, tasks, strategies, and point values for various 
actions. 
Next, participants were administered either the CCT training or SURVIVAL training and 
the task corresponding to each training. Following training, a baseline trust measure was taken 
(Trust 1) and participants were provided a briefing for Mission 1. The mission was launched 
after all participants had finished reading the briefing. The mission was discontinued after 30 
minutes. Following the mission, the Team Effectiveness and Monitoring measures were 
administered. This marked the end of the first performance episode. The second performance 
episode began with the measurement of Trust 2, followed by Mission 2, and the post-mission 
measures. The third performance episode is the same as the second, except the post-mission 
measures also included the measurement of Trust 4. The Personality and Demographics 
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questionnaires were administered last in order to avoid prompting for propensity to trust (trust 
facet of agreeableness), conscientiousness, and principles learned from any previous team 
training participants may have had. Finally, participants were thanked, debriefed about the 
purposes of the study, and offered an opportunity to ask any final questions. A summary of the 
study timeline and the measures gathered at each point is provided in Table 1. 
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Chapter 3: Results 
 
Descriptives 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics, by group, for all measures at the individual level. 
Table 2 also reports reliabilities (Alpha) for all scales in this study. Reliabilities ranged from 0.63 
– 0.95 with only a single scale (Positive Monitoring, Time 2) falling below an acceptable level of 
0.7 (Nunnaly, 1978). Scale level correlations among all variables for the CCT group level are 
reported in Table 3. Scale level correlations among all variables for the control group level are 
reported in Table 4. 
All trust, monitoring, and effectiveness measures, with the exception of DDD scores, 
were team-referent. That is, all of these items asked about an individual’s perceptions of trust, 
monitoring, or effectiveness in the team. Thus, data is analyzed at the individual level. DDD 
scores reflect an individual team member’s performance in the DDD simulation. Interestingly, 
the DDD scores do not correlate at either the team or individual level (Table 5) with the team-
referent ratings of effectiveness (i.e., team viability, team efficacy, team cooperation). This is 
perhaps because the DDD simulations system’s scoring mechanism (i.e., DDD’s model of 
effectiveness) is discordant from the participants’ views of what is effective. If effectiveness is to 
have any impact on trust, it is ultimately that portion of effectiveness that team members can 
perceive that should drive such effects. As such, I focus on the ratings of effectiveness provided 
by participants in the analyses. 
The CCT quiz was administered in order to ensure that participants understood the 
content of the CCT training. The mean score on the 8-item measure was 7.48 (Min = 4, Max = 8, 
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SD = .82) indicating that most participants understood the CCT training well. The quizzes were 
reviewed by a research assistant following administration and participants were provided 
feedback in order to reconcile any gaps in comprehension. 
Scale Dimensionality 
This section describes a series of confirmatory and exploratory factor analyses to assess 
the factor structure of the items in all self-report scales. These include trust, monitoring, and the 
three measures of effectiveness – team perceived collective efficacy, team viability, and team 
cooperation. All confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were conducted separately for each time 
point using Mplus 7 (Muthen & Muthen, 2011), and parameters were estimated using maximum 
likelihood (ML). Due to the large number of models tested, fit statistics and statistical tests are 
reported in tables rather than text. RMSEA, TLI, CFI, and SRMR fit statistics are reported. 
RMSEA values from 0.00 to 0.05 indicate close fit, those between 0.05 and 0.08 indicate fair fit, 
those between 0.08 and 0.10 indicate mediocre fit, and values above 0.10 indicate unacceptable 
fit (MacCallum, Widaman, Preacher, & Hong, 2001). TLI and CFI values greater than 0.90 
indicate that a model can be accepted (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010), and SRMR values less than 
.08 indicate good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Trust. As McAllister (1995) suggested, trust can be divided into cognitive and affective 
components. In order to examine the dimensionality of trust, a confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) was conducted to determine whether the trust measurements are best fit by a single factor 
model or the hypothesized two-factor model that separates cognitive and affective trust. For the 
one-factor model, all 10 trust items were fit to one factor, whereas for the two-factor model, the 
five items corresponding to cognitive trust were fit to one factor and the five items corresponding 
to affective trust (per McAllister 1995) were fit to two separate factors. The cognitive and 
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affective trust factors were allowed to correlate. At all four time points, the fit of the two-factor 
model was superior to the fit of the one-factor model. I therefore analyze cognitive and affective 
trust separately in all further analyses. Fit information for all models examining trust 
dimensionality is presented in Table 6.  
Monitoring dimensionality. Monitoring was measured using three items that were 
intended to assess positive, supportive monitoring and seven items intended to assess negative, 
control-based monitoring. Monitoring dimensionality was examined using a CFA to determine 
whether a single factor or a two-factor model, with positive and negative components, would 
best fit the data. Table 7 presents fit information for the one- and two-factor models of 
monitoring across all three time points.  
Although the two-factor models seem to fit better than the one-factor models, the fit of 
the two-factor models is still unacceptable. I thus also conducted an exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) to explore the factor structure of monitoring. The EFA was conducted using SPSS 21 
(IBM Corp., 2012) using both maximum likelihood estimation and principal axis factoring with 
Promax rotation. Both estimation approaches yielded similar solutions, and the principal axis 
factoring results are presented below. With 10 items, the sample of 304 participants yields a 
participant:item ratio of 30.4, which far exceeds the most conservative recommendation of 10 
participants per item proposed by Nunnally (1978) for EFA. The EFA was conducted on the 
monitoring items at Time 2. Three factors were retained per the Kaiser criterion (eigenvalues 
greater than 1). After suppressing all small factor loadings (defined as <0.28 by Sass & Schmitt, 
2010) in the factor pattern matrix (Table 8), no cross-loaded items remained in the three-factor 
solution. As expected, the positive monitoring items loaded on Factor 1; no negative monitoring 
items loaded on this factor. Negative monitoring items 1, 3, 4, and 5 loaded on Factor 2. Finally, 
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negative monitoring items 2, 6, and 7 loaded on a third factor (Factor 3). No positive monitoring 
items loaded on either Factor 2 or Factor 3. Because the first two factors are readily interpretable 
and closely fit the theoretically driven conceptualization of a two-factor monitoring solution, I 
chose to delete the negative monitoring items that loaded on Factor 3. In order to evaluate this 
new monitoring scale, the samples at Time 3 and Time 4 were used to check whether the revised 
factor structure fit better than the original through CFA. The two models with asterisks in Table 
7 present the fit information for the revised two-factor models with the items loading on the third 
factor deleted. The revised models fit the data better than the original two-factor models per a 
chi-square difference test (Time 3, X2(21) = 82.05, p<.05; Time 4, X2(21) = 118.44, p<.05)  
between the original and revised two-factor models. While CFI, TLI, and SRMR indices for the 
revised models all indicated better fit, RMSEA got worse due to the large change in degrees of 
freedom between the models. Although these results may be interesting for future researchers 
investigating the dimensionality of monitoring scales, the original structure of the scale was 
maintained (i.e., 3 items assessing positive monitoring, 7 items assessing negative monitoring). 
Despite the empirically driven EFA findings, a content review of the three items that loaded on 
the third factor did not justify removing them from the negative monitoring scale. 
Effectiveness dimensionality. Team collective efficacy (TE), team cooperation (TC), and 
team viability (TV) were all first evaluated as individual, one-factor models. Fit statistics for all 
effectiveness CFAs are presented in Table 9. One-factor models for TE and TC fit very well. Fit 
statistics were unavailable for TV due to model saturation. Another CFA evaluated whether a 
single effectiveness factor could account for all TE, TC, and TV items; this model fit poorly. 
Finally, a three-factor model with TE, TC, and TV was evaluated such that all items for each 
measure loaded on a their respective factor. The TE, TC, and TV factors were allowed to 
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correlate. This model fit well and confirms the three-factor nature of effectiveness. TE, TC, and 
TV are thus analyzed separately in all ensuing analyses. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 stated that team trust and team effectiveness would mutually 
influence one another. In order to test these hypotheses, a series of latent panel models were 
developed and tested for configural, loading, and path invariance across groups. These structural 
equation models were fitted using MPlus 7. Cognitive and affective trust were modeled 
separately for each of the three measures evaluating perceptions of effectiveness (i.e., team 
viability, team cooperation, team efficacy). The five items measuring cognitive trust at each time 
point served as indicators for the latent trust variables CogTrust1, CogTrust2, CogTrust3, and 
CogTrust4. The five items measuring affective trust at each time point served as indicators for 
the latent trust variables AffTrust1, AffTrust2, AffTrust3, and AffTrust4. Similarly, the items 
corresponding to team efficacy (TE), team viability (TV), and team cooperation (TC) at each 
time point were used as indicators of the latent variables TV2/3/4, TE2/3/4, TC2/3/4.  
Similar classes of latent variables were connected to one another in an autoregressive 
fashion (e.g., TV2!TV3!TV4). Additionally, paths were drawn between the most temporally 
proximal trust and effectiveness latent variables to represent the effects of trust on effectiveness 
and effectiveness on trust (e.g., TV2!AffTrust2, AffTrust2!TV3). It should be noted that 
while these models may appear to be cross-lagged, they are not traditional cross-lagged models. 
In traditional cross-lagged models, two variables of interests are measured at the same time and 
are both reassessed after a fixed period of time. While trust and effectiveness are measured at the 
same time in these models, the lag in trust ! effectiveness is not the same as the lag in 
effectiveness ! trust. Since effectiveness is measured directly after the end of a performance 
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episode and trust is measured just before the beginning of the next performance episode, the lag 
in time of effectiveness ! trust is minimal. However, the lag in time of trust to the subsequent 
effectiveness is approximately 30 minutes (i.e., the length of time it takes for the team to perform 
a mission). In all models, error terms for individual indicators over time were allowed to 
correlate since the same items were used at different time points. Furthermore, the individual 
item factor loadings were constrained to be the same over time in order to ensure that the 
measurement model did not change across performance episodes. Given the large quantity of 
models, fit statistics are presented in tables and parameter estimates are presented in figures in 
order to ease readability. 
In the first model (Model CV), cognitive trust was modeled with team viability. The fit 
indices for this model are presented in Table 10. First, each group was modeled individually, and 
the model fit well for each group. Next, the configural model was developed such that all 
parameter estimates were freed across groups; this model also fit well. Next, factor loadings were 
constrained across groups; this model fit well. Finally, paths constraints were added to the factor 
loading constrained model; this model also fit the data well. Although there were significant 
differences in the chi-square difference tests between the factor loading invariant model and the 
model with path constraints, the other fit indices indicated that the model fit well. Kenny (2012) 
recommends that fit indices, rather than chi-square difference tests, guide decision making in 
multiple group modeling. Multiple group models can also be compared on invariance in 
intercepts, error variance, error correlation, disturbance variances, disturbance correlation, and 
factor intercepts and means. However, since the interest in the current study was in the paths 
between trust and effectiveness variables, models were only constrained first on factor loadings 
and then paths. Since both path and factor loadings were invariant across groups, the groups 
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were combined, and an overall model including all participants from both groups, was estimated. 
The fit indices for the combined model are significantly better than those for the individual 
groups, which is expected since fit statistics take sample size into account. The combined model 
is presented in graphic form in Figure 1.  
A similar approach was employed for fitting the remaining models, which were Affective 
Trust with Team Viability (Model AV; Figure 2), Cognitive Trust with Team Efficacy (Model 
CE; Figure 3), Affective Trust with Team Efficacy (Model AE; Figure 4), Cognitive Trust with 
Team Cooperation (Model CC; Figure 5), and Affective Trust with Team Cooperation (Model 
AC; Figure 6). All of the models were combined using the same process as above. That is, 
multiple group comparisons did no justify freeing factor loadings or path coefficients between 
groups in any of the analyses. Fit indices for all models are provided in Table 10. 
In all models, all factor loadings were significant indicators of their latent variables. In 
Models CV and AV, all autoregressive paths were significant, all paths from Team Viability to 
Trust were significant, and all paths from Trust to Team Viability were significant except for the 
path between Trust3 and Team Viability 4. In Models CE and AE, all autoregressive paths were 
significant except for the path from Cognitive Trust 1 to Cognitive Trust 2 in Model CE, all 
paths from Team Efficacy to Trust were significant, and all paths from Trust to Team Efficacy 
were significant. In Models CC and AC, all autoregressive paths were significant, all paths from 
Team Cooperation to Trust were significant, and all paths from Trust to Team Cooperation were 
significant except for the paths from Cognitive/Affective Trust 2 to Team Cooperation in both 
models and the path from Cognitive Trust 3 to Team Cooperation 4 in Model CC. In general the 
standardized coefficients associated with the paths from the team effectiveness factors (team 
viability, team efficacy, team cooperation) to trust factors (cognitive trust, affective trust) tended 
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to be larger than those associated with paths from the trust factors to the team effectiveness 
factors. While this may reflect true differences in prediction, this issue is confounded by the 
unequal measurement lags between the two types of paths. Despite these limitations, it is clear 
that trust predicts effectiveness and effectiveness predicts trust, thus supporting Hypotheses 1 
and 2. 
Hypothesis 3 proposed that teams trained in CCT would be more effective than teams not 
trained in CCT and Hypothesis 7 stated that trust and effectiveness would develop more rapidly 
in teams trained in CCT compared with teams not trained in CCT. Mixed between-within 
subjects, repeated measures ANOVAs were used to examine within-person changes on 
individual variables over time and to test for differences between the training groups. Main 
effects for the training condition would support Hypothesis 3 and interaction effects between the 
group and the developmental trajectories of trust or effectiveness variables would support 
Hypothesis 7. 
Cognitive trust was assessed across four time periods (T1, T2, T3, T4). The ANOVA 
statistics are presented in Table 11 and the graph is presented in Figure 7. There was no 
significant interaction between cognitive trust and training, F(3,906) = 0.93, ns, partial eta-
squared = 0.00. There was a substantial main effect for time, F(3,906) = 12.23, p<.05, partial eta-
squared = 0.04. The trend was for cognitive trust to monotonically increase over time. 
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests revealed significant differences between all time points 
except the difference between Time 1 and Time 2. There was no main effect of training, F(1, 
302) = .05, ns, partial eta-squared = 0.00, which suggests there was no impact of training on 
cognitive trust development. 
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Affective trust (Table 11, Figure 8) was also assessed across four time periods (T1, T2, 
T3, T4). There was no significant interaction between affective trust and training, F(3,906) = 
0.58, ns, partial eta-squared = 0.00. There was a substantial main effect for time, F(3,906) = 
17.66, p<.05, partial eta-squared = 0.06. The trend was for affective trust to monotonically 
increase over time. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests revealed significant differences between 
all time points except the difference between Time 1 and Time 2 and between Time 3 and Time 
4. There was no main effect of training, F(1, 302) = .05, ns, partial eta-squared = 0.00, which 
suggests there was no impact of training on affective trust development. 
In order to investigate the development of effectiveness, DDD scores (Table 11, Figure 9) 
were assessed across three time periods (T2, T3, T4). There was no significant interaction 
between DDD scores and training, F(2,604) = 3.33, ns, partial eta-squared = 0.01. There was a 
substantial main effect for time, F(2,604) = 41.46, p<.05, partial eta-squared = 0.13. The trend 
was for DDD scores to monotonically increase over time. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests 
revealed significant differences between all time points. There was no main effect of training, 
F(1, 302) = 2.48, ns, partial eta-squared = 0.01, which suggests there was no impact of training 
on the development of DDD scores. 
Team efficacy (Table 11, Figure 10) was assessed across three time periods (T2, T3, T4). 
There was no significant interaction between team efficacy and training, F(2,604) = 0.48, ns, 
partial eta-squared = 0.00.. There was a substantial main effect for time, F(2,604) = 12.92, p<.05, 
partial eta-squared = 0.04. The trend was for team efficacy to monotonically increase over time. 
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests revealed significant differences across all time points. There 
was no main effect of training, F(1, 302) = 0.16, ns, partial eta-squared = 0.00, which suggests 
there was no impact of training on the development of team efficacy. 
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Team viability (Table 11, Figure 11) was assessed across three time periods (T2, T3, T4). 
There was no significant interaction between team viability and training, F(2,604) = 0.59, ns, 
partial eta-squared = 0.00.. There was a substantial main effect for time, F(2,604) = 4.91, p<.05, 
partial eta-squared = 0.02. The trend was for team viability to monotonically increase over time. 
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests revealed significant differences between all time points 
except the difference between Time 3 and Time 4. There was no main effect of training, F(1, 
302) = 0.62, ns, partial eta-squared = 0.00, which suggests there was no impact of training on the 
development of team viability. 
Team cooperation (Table 11, Figure 12) was assessed across three time periods (T2, T3, 
T4). There was no significant interaction between team cooperation and training, F(2,604) = 2.02, 
ns, partial eta-squared = 0.01. There was a substantial main effect for time, F(2,604) = 10.30, 
p<.05, partial eta-squared = 0.03. The trend was for team cooperation to monotonically increase 
over time. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests revealed significant differences between all time 
points except the difference between Time 3 and Time 4. There was a substantial main effect of 
training, F(1, 302) = 4.86, p<.05, partial eta-squared = 0.02, indicating that the CCT trained 
group consistently reported higher levels of team cooperation than the control group. 
Thus, Hypothesis 7 was not supported for any measures of trust or effectiveness as there 
were no interaction effects between training and the developmental trajectories of any of these 
variables. Hypothesis 3, which predicted that CCT teams would be more effective than control 
teams, was not supported for DDD scores, team efficacy, or team viability. Hypothesis 3 was 
supported for team cooperation such that participants trained in CCT consistently reported that 
their teams cooperated better across all time points. As such, Hypothesis 3 was partially 
supported. 
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Hypothesis 4 stated that teams trained in CCT would engage in more positive monitoring 
and less negative monitoring than teams not trained in CCT. Negative monitoring (Table 11, 
Figure 13) was assessed across three time periods (T2, T3, T4). There was no significant 
interaction between negative monitoring and training, F(2,604) = 0.45, ns, partial eta-squared = 
0.00. There was no main effect for time, F(2,604) = .80, ns, partial eta-squared = 0.00, 
suggesting that negative monitoring does not change over time. There was no main effect of 
training, F(1, 302) = 0.27, ns, partial eta-squared = 0.00, which suggests there were no 
differences between the training groups on negative monitoring at any time point. Positive 
monitoring (Table 11, Figure 14) was also assessed across three time periods (T2, T3, T4). There 
was no significant interaction between positive monitoring and training, F(2,604) = 0.12, ns, 
partial eta-squared = 0.00.. There was a substantial main effect for time, F(2,604) = 9.16, p<.05, 
partial eta-squared = 0.03. The trend was for positive monitoring to monotonically increase over 
time. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests revealed significant differences between all time points 
except the difference between Time 3 and Time 4. There was no main effect of training, F(1, 
302) = 1.40, ns, partial eta-squared = 0.01, which suggests there was no difference between the 
groups in positive monitoring at any time point. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was not supported. 
Hypothesis 5 stated that monitoring would be positively associated with performance in 
all teams. Table 12 presents correlations between measures of monitoring and measures of 
effectiveness separated by team at each time point. In general, all measures of monitoring 
correlated positively with measures of effectiveness, with the exception of DDD scores, at Time 
2 and Time 3. At Time 1, monitoring measures were positively correlated with effectiveness 
measures, but only for the CCT group. Correlations between positive monitoring and 
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effectiveness tended to be stronger than those between negative monitoring and effectiveness. 
Thus, Hypothesis 5 was partially supported. 
Hypothesis 6 proposed that teams trained in CCT would have higher levels of initial trust 
than teams not trained in CCT. An independent samples t-test comparing the CCT (M = 23.04, 
SD = 3.72) and control group (M = 23.34, SD = 4.06) on cognitive trust at Time 1 was not 
significant, t(302) = -0.01, ns. Another independent samples t-test comparing the CCT (M = 
21.75, SD = 4.29) and control group (M = 21.45, SD = 4.57) on affective trust at Time 1 was not 
significant, t(302) = 0.57, ns. Thus, for both cognitive and affective trust, Hypothesis 6 was not 
supported.  
Hypothesis 8 stated that propensity to trust would be associated with initial team trust. In 
order to test this hypothesis, cognitive trust and affective trust at Time 1 were correlated with the 
trust facet of agreeableness from the IPIP. While propensity to trust was uncorrelated with initial 
affective trust (r = .10, ns), it was correlated with initial cognitive trust (r = .17, p < .05). Since 
the groups were trained in either the CCT or control conditions before they were measured on 
their propensity to trust and their initial cognitive and affective trust in their teams, it is also 
important to examine these correlations separated by group in case the training impacted these 
relationships. As previously mentioned, there was no difference in initial cognitive and affective 
between the groups. Additionally, there was no difference between the groups in propensity to 
trust, t(302) = -1.06, ns. In the CCT group, propensity to trust was not correlated with initial 
affective trust (r = .15, ns), but was correlated with initial cognitive trust (r = .20, p < .05). In the 
control group, propensity to trust was not correlated with initial affective trust (r = .06, ns) or 
with initial cognitive trust (r = .13, ns). Thus, Hypothesis 8 was partially supported. 
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Hypothesis 9 proposed that conscientiousness would attenuate the relationship between 
CCT training and effectiveness. This hypothesis was not tested because there was no effect of 
CCT training on objective performance (DDD scores). Although there were group differences in 
perceptions of team cooperation, there is no theoretical basis for examining why individual 
conscientiousness might affect perceptions of team cooperation. 
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Figure 1. Model CV - Cognitive Trust with Team Viability. All errors for identical items 
correlated across time periods. All factor loadings for identical items constrained across time 
periods. Parameters estimates reported as: Raw (Raw SE) Standardized. Model fit: X2(343) = 
476.79, p<.05; RMSEA [90%CI] = .04[.03 .04]; CFI = .98; TLI = .98; SRMR = .06 
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Figure 2. Model AV - Affective Trust with Team Viability. All errors for identical items 
correlated across time periods. All factor loadings for identical items constrained across time 
periods. Parameters estimates reported as: Raw (Raw SE) Standardized. Model fit: X2(343) = 
749.53, p<.05; RMSEA [90%CI] = .06[.06 .07]; CFI = .94; TLI = .93; SRMR = .07 
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Figure 3. Model CE - Cognitive Trust with Team Efficacy. All errors for identical items 
correlated across time periods. All factor loadings for identical items constrained across time 
periods. Parameters estimates reported as: Raw (Raw SE) Standardized. Model fit: X2(429) = 
702.59, p<.05; RMSEA [90%CI] = .05[.04 .05]; CFI = .97; TLI = .96; SRMR = .06 
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Figure 4. Model AE - Affective Trust with Team Efficacy. All errors for identical items 
correlated across time periods. All factor loadings for identical items constrained across time 
periods. Parameters estimates reported as: Raw (Raw SE) Standardized. Model fit: X2(429) = 
908.44, p<.05; RMSEA [90%CI] = .06[.06 .07]; CFI = .95; TLI = .94; SRMR = .07  
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Figure 5. Model CC - Cognitive Trust with Team Cooperation. All errors for identical items 
correlated across time periods. All factor loadings for identical items constrained across time 
periods. Parameters estimates reported as: Raw (Raw SE) Standardized. Model fit: X2(524) = 
979.87, p<.05; RMSEA [90%CI] = .05[.05 .06]; CFI = .94; TLI = .94; SRMR = .07 
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Figure 6. Model AC - Affective Trust with Team Cooperation. All errors for identical items 
correlated across time periods. All factor loadings for identical items constrained across time 
periods. Parameters estimates reported as: Raw (Raw SE) Standardized. Model fit: X2(524) = 
1159.18, p<.05; RMSEA [90%CI] = .06[.06 .07]; CFI = .93; TLI = .92; SRMR = .07 
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Figure 7. Changes in cognitive trust over time, by training. See Table 11 for ANOVA statistics. 
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Figure 8. Changes in affective trust over time, by training. See Table 11 for ANOVA statistics. 
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Figure 9. Changes in DDD scores over time, by training. See Table 11 for ANOVA statistics. 
 87 
 
Figure 10. Changes in team efficacy over time, by training. See Table 11 for ANOVA statistics. 
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Figure 11. Changes in team viability over time, by training. See Table 11 for ANOVA statistics. 
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Figure 12. Changes in team cooperation over time, by training. See Table 11 for ANOVA 
statistics. 
 90 
 
Figure 13. Changes in negative monitoring over time, by training. See Table 11 for ANOVA 
statistics. 
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Figure 14. Changes in positive monitoring over time, by training. See Table 11 for ANOVA 
statistics. 
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Activities (in order) Measure Name
Consent
DDD Training
DDD Practice Mission
CCT/Control Training CCT Quiz
Trust Measure Trust 1 (Cognitive and Affective)
DDD Mission 1 DDD Score
Effectiveness Measure Team Viability 2, Team Efficacy 2, Team Cooperation 2
Monitoring Measure Monitoring 2
Trust Measure Trust 2 (Cognitive and Affective)
DDD Mission 2 DDD Score
Effectiveness Measure Team Viability 3, Team Efficacy 3, Team Cooperation 3
Monitoring Measure Monitoring 3 
Trust Measure Trust 3 (Cognitive and Affective)
DDD Mission 3 DDD Score
Effectiveness Measure Team Viability 4, Team Efficacy 4, Team Cooperation 4
Monitoring Measure Monitoring 4
Trust Measure Trust 4 (Cognitive and Affective)
Personality Trust Agreeableness, Conscientiousness
Demographics  
 
Table 1 
Study Timeline 
 93 
 
Measure Items α N Min Max Mean SD N Min Max Mean SD
Trust T1 10 0.85 150 1.90 6.00 4.48 0.73 154 1.30 6.00 4.48 0.76
Trust T2 10 0.86 150 2.10 6.00 4.53 0.85 154 2.10 5.90 4.54 0.79
Trust T3 10 0.87 150 1.80 6.00 4.70 0.87 154 1.80 6.00 4.71 0.85
Trust T4 10 0.89 150 1.20 6.00 4.83 0.87 154 1.10 6.00 4.71 0.92
Cog Trust T1 5 0.75 150 1.80 6.00 4.61 0.74 154 1.40 6.00 4.67 0.81
Cog Trust T2 5 0.76 150 2.00 6.00 4.69 0.83 154 2.60 6.00 4.72 0.82
Cog Trust T3 5 0.76 150 2.40 6.00 4.78 0.85 154 2.20 6.00 4.84 0.84
Cog Trust T4 5 0.77 150 1.20 6.00 4.95 0.86 154 1.20 6.00 4.87 0.89
Aff Trust T1 5 0.81 150 2.00 6.00 4.35 0.86 154 1.00 6.00 4.29 0.91
Aff Trust T2 5 0.85 150 1.60 6.00 4.38 1.05 154 1.00 6.00 4.35 1.04
Aff Trust T3 5 0.87 150 1.20 6.00 4.61 1.05 154 1.20 6.00 4.58 1.10
Aff Trust T4 5 0.89 150 1.00 6.00 4.71 1.06 154 1.00 6.00 4.56 1.14
Mon T2 10 0.82 150 1.62 5.24 3.66 0.68 154 1.60 5.62 3.57 0.76
Mon T3 10 0.86 150 1.62 5.19 3.77 0.78 154 1.07 6.00 3.66 0.97
Mon T4 10 0.88 150 1.24 5.64 3.74 0.89 154 1.07 6.00 3.68 1.05
PosMon T2 3 0.63 150 1.29 5.14 3.39 0.81 154 1.00 6.00 3.32 0.90
PosMon T3 3 0.76 150 1.14 5.43 3.44 0.89 154 1.00 6.00 3.37 1.04
PosMon T4 3 0.81 150 1.00 5.43 3.37 1.00 154 1.00 6.00 3.36 1.13
NegMon T2 7 0.81 150 1.67 6.00 3.92 0.81 154 1.33 5.67 3.82 0.87
NegMon T3 7 0.83 150 1.67 5.67 4.10 0.90 154 1.00 6.00 3.95 1.12
NegMon T4 7 0.85 150 1.00 6.00 4.12 0.98 154 1.00 6.00 4.01 1.19
TV T2 3 0.86 150 1.67 6.00 4.82 0.96 154 2.00 6.00 4.73 0.97
TV T3 3 0.87 150 1.00 6.00 4.90 1.02 154 1.00 6.00 4.88 1.09
TV T4 3 0.85 150 1.00 6.00 4.99 1.06 154 1.00 6.00 4.86 1.19
TC T2 5 0.82 150 2.60 6.00 4.89 0.79 154 2.40 6.00 4.72 0.84
TC T3 5 0.83 150 2.20 6.00 4.99 0.82 154 1.20 6.00 4.86 0.91
TC T4 5 0.85 150 1.60 6.00 5.13 0.85 154 1.00 6.00 4.85 0.96
TE T2 4 0.91 150 1.50 6.00 4.69 0.91 154 2.25 6.00 4.66 0.91
TE T3 4 0.92 150 1.00 6.00 4.80 1.06 154 1.50 6.00 4.80 1.00
TE T4 4 0.95 150 1.00 6.00 4.97 1.10 154 1.00 6.00 4.88 1.08
DDD T2 1 - 147 0.0 750.0 230.7 168.4 151.0 0.0 665.0 245.1 153.9
DDD T3 1 - 147 0.0 695.0 282.2 158.1 151.0 0.0 840.0 340.2 180.7
DDD T4 1 - 144 0.0 825.0 345.3 187.4 154.0 0.0 880.0 350.9 185.8
Pers. Trust 10 0.86 150 2.10 5.00 3.66 0.60 154 1.40 5.00 3.54 0.68
Pers. Consc. 10 0.86 150 1.70 5.00 3.71 0.61 154 1.40 5.00 3.79 0.72
DDD Quiz 8 - 150 4.00 8.00 7.48 0.82 - - - - -
CCT Control
 
Note. T1 = Time 1, T2 = Time 2, T3 = Time 4; Cog Trust = Cognitive Trust; Aff Trust = Affective Trust; Mon = 
Monitoring; PosMon = Positive Monitoring; NegMon = Negative Monitoring; TV = Team Viability; TC = Team 
Cooperation; TE = Team Efficacy; DDD = DDD scenario score; Pers. = Personality 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
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*    Significant at p < .05 
**  Significant at p < .01 
Table 3 
CCT Correlation Matrix 
Trust T1 Trust T2 Trust T3 Trust T4 Cog Trust T1
Cog 
Trust T2
Cog 
Trust T3
Cog 
Trust T4
Aff Trust 
T1
Aff Trust 
T2
Aff Trust 
T3
Aff Trust 
T4 Mon T2
Trust T1 -
Trust T2 .49** -
Trust T3 .31** .77** -
Trust T4 .23** .68** .86** -
Cog Trust T1 .89** .42** .22** .15 -
Cog Trust T2 .43** .88** .64** .53** .48** -
Cog Trust T3 .26** .70** .89** .74** .25** .72** -
Cog Trust T4 .18* .59** .75** .89** .18* .58** .79** -
Aff Trust T1 .92** .47** .33** .27** .65** .31** .23** .14 -
Aff Trust T2 .46** .93** .74** .68** .30** .64** .57** .50** .52** -
Aff Trust T3 .30** .70** .93** .81** .17* .48** .67** .60** .36** .76** -
Aff Trust T4 .24** .64** .80** .93** .10 .41** .59** .66** .33** .72** .86** -
Mon T2 .20* .27** .28** .30** .10 .17* .16 .19* .25** .31** .33** .33** -
Mon T3 .08 .24** .41** .39** .00 .11 .18* .22** .15 .31** .52** .47** .63**
Mon T4 .12 .25** .40** .44** .01 .10 .18* .26** .19* .34** .51** .52** .57**
PosMon T2 .23** .24** .21** .24** .15 .08 .05 .10 .26** .32** .31** .31** .42**
PosMon T3 .07 .14 .27** .29** -.01 -.04 .05 .13 .13 .26** .40** .38** .33**
PosMon T4 .13 .10 .18* .27** .04 -.09 -.05 .08 .19* .24** .34** .39** .34**
NegMon T2 .25** .29** .27** .29** .15 .13 .10 .15 .29** .37** .37** .37** .68**
NegMon T3 .08 .19* .34** .36** -.01 .01 .10 .17* .15 .31** .48** .46** .47**
NegMon T4 .14 .16 .27** .35** .03 -.04 .02 .15 .21* .29** .43** .47** .45**
TV T2 .38** .74** .63** .61** .32** .66** .56** .53** .37** .68** .58** .58** .21**
TV T3 .22** .61** .82** .78** .16* .52** .74** .73** .23** .58** .77** .70** .20*
TV T4 .10 .53** .71** .81** .08 .46** .63** .78** .09 .49** .67** .71** .23**
TC T2 .41** .79** .65** .59** .37** .69** .59** .50** .38** .74** .59** .57** .32**
TC T3 .22** .62** .80** .76** .20* .54** .74** .70** .20* .58** .73** .69** .26**
TC T4 .16 .53** .72** .82** .11 .43** .63** .74** .17* .53** .68** .76** .27**
TE T2 .42** .76** .70** .62** .38** .67** .63** .56** .39** .70** .64** .58** .25**
TE T3 .22** .59** .82** .74** .19* .53** .78** .72** .22** .53** .72** .64** .16
TE T4 .09 .55** .74** .82** .06 .48** .68** .79** .11 .50** .67** .71** .19*
DDD T2 -.06 -.14 -.13 -.17* .00 -.08 -.14 -.23** -.11 -.17* -.10 -.10 -.03
DDD T3 .10 -.03 -.06 -.02 .14 .02 .00 -.03 .05 -.06 -.10 -.01 .09
DDD T4 -.04 -.03 -.06 -.01 -.03 .00 -.11 -.09 -.05 -.04 -.01 .06 .19*
Pers. Trust .20* .15 .15 .16 .13 .08 .15 .17* .22** .19* .13 .12 .15
Pers. Agree. .20* .12 .12 .14 .14 .06 .10 .15 .21** .15 .12 .11 .14
Pers. Consc. .19* .18* .06 .08 .20* .16 .04 .06 .15 .17* .06 .08 .10
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*    Significant at p < .05 
**  Significant at p < .01 
Table 3 (cont.) 
CCT Correlation Matrix 
Trust T1
Trust T2
Trust T3
Trust T4
Cog Trust T1
Cog Trust T2
Cog Trust T3
Cog Trust T4
Aff Trust T1
Aff Trust T2
Aff Trust T3
Aff Trust T4
Mon T2
Mon T3
Mon T4
PosMon T2
PosMon T3
PosMon T4
NegMon T2
NegMon T3
NegMon T4
TV T2
TV T3
TV T4
TC T2
TC T3
TC T4
TE T2
TE T3
TE T4
DDD T2
DDD T3
DDD T4
Pers. Trust
Pers. Agree.
Pers. Consc.
Mon T3 Mon T4 PosMon T2
PosMon 
T3
PosMon 
T4
NeMon 
T2
NeMon 
T3
NeMon 
T4 TV T2 TV T3 TV T4 TC T2 TC T3
-
.83** -
.44** .56** -
.53** .60** .73** -
.46** .59** .64** .79** -
.57** .64** .95** .70** .64** -
.75** .75** .72** .96** .77** .74** -
.63** .78** .68** .81** .97** .70** .84** -
.23** .21* .17* .12 .09 .21** .17* .14 -
.37** .35** .14 .24** .16* .19* .31** .24** .68** -
.36** .36** .15 .26** .20* .20* .33** .27** .63** .82** -
.29** .29** .19* .09 .09 .26** .17* .16* .71** .57** .51** -
.40** .37** .17* .22** .10 .23** .30** .19* .61** .80** .71** .69** -
.39** .41** .13 .20* .15 .20* .29** .25** .56** .74** .79** .60** .83**
.31** .30** .33** .23** .16 .35** .28** .22** .80** .64** .57** .72** .63**
.32** .31** .16* .25** .13 .18* .30** .20* .56** .80** .67** .51** .77**
.31** .35** .17* .26** .20* .20* .31** .27** .53** .72** .84** .48** .72**
.04 .05 .02 .00 .01 .00 .01 .03 -.03 -.11 -.11 -.04 -.07
.02 .05 -.04 -.04 .04 .00 -.02 .05 .00 -.10 -.07 .12 .00
.10 .16 .02 .08 .10 .09 .10 .13 .03 -.06 -.03 .04 -.03
.13 .12 -.01 -.02 -.04 .04 .02 .01 .18* .19* .17* .18* .17*
.09 .09 .05 -.01 .05 .09 .03 .07 .12 .13 .14 .14 .10
.09 .14 .06 .04 .07 .08 .06 .10 .09 .08 .04 .15 .03
Trust T1
Trust T2
Trust T3
Trust T4
Cog Trust T1
Cog Trust T2
Cog Trust T3
Cog Trust T4
Aff Trust T1
Aff Trust T2
Aff Trust T3
Aff Trust T4
Mon T2
Mon T3
Mon T4
PosMon T2
PosMon T3
PosMon T4
NegMon T2
NegMon T3
NegMon T4
TV T2
TV T3
TV T4
TC T2
TC T3
TC T4
TE T2
TE T3
TE T4
DDD T2
DDD T3
DDD T4
Pers. Trust
Pers. Agree.
Pers. Consc.
Mon T3 Mon T4 PosMon T2
PosMon 
T3
PosMon 
T4
NeMon 
T2
NeMon 
T3
NeMon 
T4 TV T2 TV T3 TV T4 TC T2 TC T3
-
.83** -
.44** .56** -
.53** .60** .73** -
.46** .59** .64** .79** -
.57** .64** .95** .70** .64** -
.75** .75** .72** .96** .77** .74** -
.63** .78** .68** .81** .97** .70** .84** -
.23** .21* .17* .12 .09 .21** .17* .14 -
.37** .35** .14 .24** .16* .19* .31** .24** .68** -
.36** .36** .15 .26** .20* .20* .33** .27** .63** .82** -
.29** .29** .19* .09 .09 .26** .17* .16* .71** .57** .51** -
.40** .37** .17* .22** .10 .23** .30** .19* .61** .80** .71** .69** -
.39** .41** .13 .20* .15 .20* .29** .25** .56** .74** .79** .60** .83**
.31** .30** .33** .23** .16 .35** .28** .22** .80** .64** .57** .72** .63**
.32** .31** .16* .25** .13 .18* .30** .20* .56** .80** .67** .51** .77**
.31** .35** .17* .26** .20* .20* .31** .27** .53** .72** .84** .48** .72**
.04 .05 .02 .00 .01 .00 .01 .03 -.03 -.11 -.11 -.04 -.07
.02 .05 -.04 -.04 .04 .00 -.02 .05 .00 -.10 -.07 .12 .00
.10 .16 .02 .08 .10 .09 .10 .13 .03 -.06 -.03 .04 -.03
.13 .12 -.01 -.02 -.04 .04 .02 .01 .18* .19* .17* .18* .17*
.09 .09 .05 -.01 .05 .09 .03 .07 .12 .13 .14 .14 .10
.09 .14 .06 .04 .07 .08 .06 .10 .09 .08 .04 .15 .03
Trust T1
Trust T2
Trust T3
Trust T4
Cog Trust T1
Cog Trust T2
Cog Trust T3
Cog Trust T4
Aff Trust T1
Aff Trust T2
Aff Trust T3
Aff Trust T4
Mon T2
Mon T3
Mon T4
PosMon T2
PosMon T3
PosMon T4
NegMon T2
NegMon T3
NegMon T4
TV T2
TV T3
TV T4
TC T2
TC T3
TC T4
TE T2
TE T3
TE T4
 2
 3
DDD 4
ers. Trust
ers. Agree.
Pers. Consc.
TC T4 TE T2 TE T3 TE T4 DDD T2 DDD T3 DDD T4 PT PA PC
-
.52** -
.68** .70** -
.77** .60** .74** -
-.09 -.05 -.15 -.13 -
.05 .02 -.06 -.08 .26** -
.01 -.03 -.14 -.05 .29** .27** -
.24** .12 .18* .12 -.12 -.11 .03 -
.21* .15 .14 .12 -.11 -.08 -.02 .60** -
.05 .18* .10 .04 -.17* -.10 -.01 .17* .23** -
rust T1
rust T2
rust T3
rust 4
Cog Trust T1
Cog Trust T2
Cog Trust T3
Cog Trust T4
Aff Trust T1
Aff Trust T2
Aff Trust T3
Aff Trust T4
Mon T2
Mon T3
Mon T4
PosMon T2
PosMon T3
PosMon T4
NegMon T2
NegMon T3
NegMon T4
TV T2
TV T3
TV T4
TC T2
TC T3
TC T4
TE T2
TE T3
TE T4
DDD T2
DDD T3
DDD T4
Pers. Trust
Pers. Agree.
Pers. Consc.
TC T4 TE T2 TE T3 TE T4 DDD T2 DDD T3 DDD T4 PT PA PC
-
.52** -
.68** .70** -
.77** .60** .74** -
-.09 -.05 -.15 -.13 -
.05 .02 -.06 -.08 .26** -
.01 -.03 -.14 -.05 .29** .27** -
.24** .12 .18* .12 -.12 -.11 .03 -
.21* .15 .14 .12 -.11 -.08 -.02 .60** -
.05 .18* .10 .04 -.17* -.10 -.01 .17* .23** -
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*    Significant at p < .05 
**  Significant at p < .01 
 
Table 4 
Control Correlation Matrix 
Trust T1 Trust T2 Trust T3 Trust T4 Cog Trust T1
Cog 
Trust T2
Cog 
Trust T3
Cog 
Trust T4
Aff Trust 
T1
Aff Trust 
T2
Aff Trust 
T3
Aff Trust 
T4 Mon T2
Trust T1 -
Trust T2 .38** -
Trust T3 .42** .67** -
Trust T4 .27** .60** .85** -
Cog Trust T1 .86** .32** .34** .20* -
Cog Trust T2 .29** .80** .49** .39** .38** -
Cog Trust T3 .29** .60** .83** .68** .34** .65** -
Cog Trust T4 .22** .57** .75** .87** .25** .57** .80** -
Aff Trust T1 .89** .34** .40** .27** .55** .13 .19* .14 -
Aff Trust T2 .34** .88** .62** .59** .18* .42** .40** .41** .41** -
Aff Trust T3 .42** .57** .90** .78** .26** .26** .51** .54** .47** .65** -
Aff Trust T4 .26** .51** .77** .92** .12 .18* .46** .61** .32** .62** .83** -
Mon T2 .24** .29** .32** .29** .13 .03 .10 .10 .28** .41** .42** .39** -
Mon T3 .18* .18* .42** .42** .12 .02 .20* .25** .20* .26** .50** .48** .65**
Mon T4 .11 .20* .42** .50** .05 .02 .23** .31** .13 .29** .48** .56** .54**
PosMon T2 .18* .18* .25** .26** .09 -.07 .00 .06 .22** .32** .38** .38** .46**
PosMon T3 .09 .09 .23** .27** -.01 -.13 -.02 .04 .16 .24** .37** .40** .44**
PosMon T4 .03 .07 .16 .24** -.06 -.12 -.04 .03 .11 .20* .28** .36** .32**
NegMon T2 .22** .24** .31** .31** .11 -.05 .04 .08 .27** .40** .45** .43** .70**
NegMon T3 .13 .13 .32** .35** .03 -.09 .06 .12 .19* .27** .45** .46** .55**
NegMon T4 .06 .12 .26** .35** -.03 -.09 .04 .12 .13 .25** .37** .46** .43**
TV T2 .21* .65** .52** .47** .22** .60** .52** .51** .15 .51** .40** .35** .15
TV T3 .19* .50** .82** .71** .14 .44** .76** .71** .19* .41** .67** .59** .19*
TV T4 .16* .48** .71** .80** .15 .41** .64** .78** .13 .39** .60** .67** .17*
TC T2 .32** .66** .55** .47** .30** .52** .49** .46** .26** .58** .46** .39** .19*
TC T3 .26** .42** .77** .67** .22** .33** .65** .62** .23** .37** .69** .59** .22**
TC T4 .19* .45** .72** .81** .17* .35** .63** .76** .16* .40** .62** .71** .15
TE T2 .28** .57** .44** .37** .27** .53** .43** .40** .23** .44** .34** .28** .09
TE T3 .27** .52** .74** .61** .18* .40** .69** .60** .29** .48** .61** .51** .16*
TE T4 .10 .50** .71** .77** .04 .42** .64** .73** .13 .42** .60** .67** .16*
DDD T2 .01 .06 .03 .12 .04 .05 .06 .14 -.03 .06 -.01 .09 .03
DDD T3 -.04 .16 .17* .23** .02 .11 .21** .24** -.09 .15 .09 .18* .16*
DDD T4 -.05 .02 .03 .09 .05 .05 .07 .09 -.14 .00 -.02 .07 .02
Pers. Trust .21** .15 .09 .22** .23** .04 .06 .17* .15 .19* .08 .22** -.07
Pers. Agree. .29** .22** .18* .20* .33** .24** .21** .23** .19* .14 .11 .13 -.04
Pers. Consc. .10 .07 .15 .16* .13 .03 .11 .12 .05 .08 .15 .17* .09
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*    Significant at p < .05 
**  Significant at p < .01 
Table 4 (cont.) 
Control Correlation Matrix 
Trust T1
Trust T2
Trust T3
Trust T4
Cog Trust T1
Cog Trust T2
Cog Trust T3
Cog Trust T4
Aff Trust T1
Aff Trust T2
Aff Trust T3
Aff Trust T4
Mon T2
Mon T3
Mon T4
PosMon T2
PosMon T3
PosMon T4
NegMon T2
NegMon T3
NegMon T4
TV T2
TV T3
TV T4
TC T2
TC T3
TC T4
TE T2
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DDD T2
DDD T3
DDD T4
Pers. Trust
Pers. Agree.
Pers. Consc.
Mon T3 Mon T4 PosMon T2
PosMon 
T3
PosMon 
T4
NeMon 
T2
NeMon 
T3
NeMon 
T4 TV T2 TV T3 TV T4 TC T2 TC T3
-
.78** -
.53** .49** -
.61** .58** .76** -
.50** .64** .72** .85** -
.64** .57** .96** .75** .68** -
.80** .71** .75** .96** .81** .78** -
.64** .82** .71** .83** .97** .71** .85** -
.14 .16* .13 .06 .01 .15 .09 .06 -
.33** .34** .17* .17* .09 .20* .24** .19* .60** -
.36** .39** .23** .22** .19* .24** .29** .27** .46** .73** -
.08 .15 .08 -.04 -.06 .13 .00 .00 .77** .54** .43** -
.39** .37** .17* .16* .11 .21** .26** .20* .51** .81** .64** .57** -
.33** .40** .15 .15 .16 .17* .23** .25** .49** .69** .84** .54** .74**
.02 .13 .15 .04 .04 .15 .03 .07 .73** .49** .34** .68** .38**
.28** .30** .17* .12 .11 .19* .19* .18* .57** .74** .57** .56** .72**
.30** .42** .23** .20* .22** .24** .25** .31** .48** .68** .82** .46** .60**
-.02 .02 .01 -.01 -.04 .02 -.02 -.03 -.02 .05 .14 .03 .03
.19* .13 .16* .15 .08 .18* .17* .11 .22** .20* .24** .22** .15
.12 .09 .05 .06 -.01 .05 .09 .02 .10 .04 .12 .08 -.03
.00 .06 .12 .14 .12 .07 .11 .11 .13 .08 .16* .13 .11
.04 .03 .01 .10 .02 -.01 .09 .03 .17* .16 .17* .21** .16*
.17* .27** .13 .13 .16* .14 .16* .21** .06 .15 .16* .15 .24**
Trust T1
Trust T2
Trust T3
Trust T4
Cog Trust T1
Cog Trust T2
Cog Trust T3
Cog Trust T4
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Mon T2
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Mon T4
PosMon T2
PosMon T3
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NegMon T3
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TV T2
TV T3
TV T4
TC T2
TC T3
TC T4
TE T2
TE T3
TE T4
DDD T2
DDD T3
DDD T4
Pers. Trust
Pers. Agree.
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PosMon 
T4
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T2
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T4 TV T2 TV T3 TV T4 TC T2 TC T3
-
.78** -
.53** .49** -
.61** .58** .76** -
.50** .64** .72** .85** -
.64** .57** .96** .75** .68** -
.80** .71** .75** .96** .81** .78** -
.64** .82** .71** .83** .97** .71** .85** -
.14 .16* .13 .06 .01 .15 .09 .06 -
.33** .34** .17* .17* .09 .20* .24** .19* .60** -
.36** .39** .23** .22** .19* .24** .29** .27** .46** .73** -
.08 .15 .08 -.04 -.06 .13 .00 .00 .77** .54** .43** -
.39** .37** .17* .16* .11 .21** .26** .20* .51** .81** .64** .57** -
.33** .40** .15 .15 .16 .17* .23** .25** .49** .69** .84** .54** .74**
.02 .13 .15 .04 .04 .15 .03 .07 .73** .49** .34** .68** .38**
.28** .30** .17* .12 .11 .19* .19* .18* .57** .74** .57** .56** .72**
.30** .42** .23** .20* .22** .24** .25** .31** .48** .68** .82** .46** .60**
-.02 .02 .01 -.01 -.04 .02 -.02 -.03 -.02 .05 .14 .03 .03
.19* .13 .16* .15 .08 .18* .17* .11 .22** .20* .24** .22** .15
.12 .09 .05 .06 -.01 .05 .09 .02 .10 .04 .12 .08 -.03
.00 .06 .12 .14 .12 .07 .11 .11 .13 .08 .16* .13 .11
.04 .03 .01 .10 .02 -.01 .09 .03 .17* .16 .17* .21** .16*
.17* .27** .13 .13 .16* .14 .16* .21** .06 .15 .16* .15 .24**
Trust T1
Trust T2
Trust T3
Trust T4
Cog Trust T1
Cog Trust T2
Cog Trust T3
Cog Trust T4
Aff Trust T1
Aff Trust T2
Aff Trust T3
Aff Trust T4
Mon T2
Mon T3
Mon T4
PosMon T2
PosMon T3
PosMon T4
NegMon T2
NegMon T3
NegMon T4
TV T2
TV T3
TV T4
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TC T3
TC T4
TE T2
TE T3
TE T4
DDD T2
DDD T3
DDD T4
Pers. Trust
Pers. Agree.
Pers. Consc.
TC T4 TE T2 TE T3 TE T4 DDD T2 DDD T3 DDD T4 PT PA PC
-
. 4 -
.61** .62** -
.76** .50** .70** -
.12 -.01 -.01 .07 -
.24** .16 .15 .18* .30** -
.10 .03 -.05 .11 .29** .28** -
.19* .05 .02 .10 .03 .18* .04 -
.17* .06 .08 .10 .02 .08 .11 .67** -
.22** .17* .25** .22** .02 .01 -.02 .12 .19* -
rust T1
rust T2
rust T3
rust T4
Cog Trust T1
Cog Trust T2
Cog Trust T3
Cog Trust T4
Aff Trust T1
Aff Trust T2
Aff Trust T3
Aff Trust T4
Mon T2
Mon T3
Mon T4
PosMon T2
PosMon T3
PosMon T4
NegMon T2
NegMon T3
NegMon T4
TV T2
TV T3
TV T4
TC T2
TC T3
TC T4
TE T2
TE T3
TE T4
DDD T2
DDD T3
DDD T4
Pers. Trust
Pers. Agree.
Pers. Consc.
TC T4 TE T2 TE T3 TE T4 DDD T2 DDD T3 DDD T4 PT PA PC
-
.34** -
.61** .62** -
.76** .50** .70** -
.12 -.01 -.01 .07 -
.24** .16 .15 .18* .30** -
.10 .03 -.05 .11 .29** .28** -
.19* .05 .02 .10 .03 .18* .04 -
.17* .06 .08 .10 .02 .08 .11 .67** -
.22** .17* .25** .22** .02 .01 -.02 .12 .19* -
 98 
 
Team 
Viability
Team 
Cooperation
Team 
Efficacy
Individual DDD Score -0.03 -0.01 -0.03
Team DDD Score -0.04 -0.07 -0.02
Individual DDD Score 0.07 0.07 0.05
Team DDD Score 0.11 0.07 0.17
Individual DDD Score 0.05 0.06 0.03
Team DDD Score 0.06 -0.02 0.18
Mission 1
Mission 2
Mission 3
 
Note. No correlations significant 
Table 5  
Correlations between DDD scores and subjective team effectiveness measures 
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Time Factors χ2 df p RMSEA [90% CI] CFI TLI SRMR
1 One 199.70 35 0.00 0.12 [0.11 0.14] 0.87 0.83 0.06
1 Two 88.80 34 0.00 0.07 [0.05 0.09] 0.96 0.94 0.04
2 One 317.36 35 0.00 0.16 [0.15 0.18] 0.81 0.75 0.08
2 Two 116.13 34 0.00 0.09 [0.07 0.11] 0.94 0.93 0.05
3 One 340.71 35 0.00 0.17 [0.15 0.19] 0.83 0.78 0.07
3 Two 163.09 34 0.00 0.11 [0.10 0.13] 0.93 0.90 0.05
4 One 279.36 35 0.00 0.15 [0.14 0.17] 0.88 0.85 0.06
4 Two 117.32 34 0.00 0.09 [0.07 0.11] 0.96 0.95 0.05  
Note. “One” refers to fit for a single factor solution. “Two” refers to fit for a correlated cognitive and affective trust 
two-factor solution. 
 
Table 6  
Confirmatory factor analyses for trust items 
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Time Factors χ2 df p RMSEA     
[90% CI]
CFI TLI SRMR Δχ2 Δχ2 
df 
Δχ2 
p 
2 One 217.68 35 0.00 0.13 [0.12 0.15] 0.85 0.81 0.08
2 Two 164.92 34 0.00 0.11 [0.10 0.13] 0.89 0.86 0.07
3 One 249.87 35 0.00 0.14 [0.13 0.16] 0.86 0.82 0.08
3 Two 158.81 34 0.00 0.11 [0.09 0.13] 0.92 0.89 0.07
3* Two 76.76 13 0.00 0.13 [0.10 0.16] 0.95 0.92 0.06 82.05 21 0.00
4 One 296.72 35 0.00 0.16 [0.14 0.17] 0.87 0.83 0.07
4 Two 186.72 34 0.00 0.12 [0.11 0.14] 0.92 0.90 0.07
4* Two 68.28 13 0.00 0.12 [0.09 0.15] 0.97 0.95 0.05 118.44 21 0.00  
* Two-factor monitoring model validation after items loading on a third factor were deleted based on an EFA 
Table 7  
Confirmatory factor analyses for monitoring items 
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Item Neg Pos 3
MP2_1 0.48
MP2_2 0.79
MP2_3 0.51
MN2_1 0.62
MN2_2 0.38
MN2_3 0.92
MN2_4 1.00
MN2_5 0.80
MN2_6 0.55
MN2_7 0.65
Factor
 
Note. Factor pattern matrix. Principal axis factoring with Promax rotation. Loadings <0.28 suppressed.  
Table 8  
Exploratory factor analysis for monitoring items 
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Time χ2 df p RMSEA [90% CI] CFI TLI SRMR
2 7.09 5 0.21 0.04 [0.00 0.09] 1.00 0.99 0.02
3 15.30 5 0.01 0.08 [0.04 0.13] 0.99 0.98 0.02
4 28.03 5 0.00 0.12 [0.08 0.17] 0.98 0.96 0.02
2 3.68 2 0.16 0.05 [0.00 0.14] 1.00 0.99 0.01
3 6.96 2 0.03 0.09 [0.02 0.17] 1.00 0.98 0.01
4 2.61 2 0.27 0.03 [0.00 0.12] 1.00 1.00 0.00
2 - - - - - - -
3 - - - - - - -
4 - - - - - - -
2 363.87 54 0.00 0.14 [0.12 0.15] 0.88 0.85 0.05
3 374.99 54 0.00 0.14 [0.13 0.15] 0.89 0.87 0.05
4 519.72 54 0.00 0.17 [0.16 0.18] 0.88 0.85 0.05
2 170.04 51 0.00 0.09 [0.07 0.10] 0.95 0.94 0.04
3 146.82 51 0.00 0.08 [0.06 0.09] 0.97 0.96 0.03
4 201.30 51 0.00 .10 [0.08 0.11] 0.96 0.95 0.04
One-Factor Team Cooperation (TC)
One-Factor Team Efficacy (TE)
One-Factor Team Viability (TV)*
One-Factor TC, TE, TV
Three-Factor TC, TE, TV
 
* Fit statistics not estimated due to model saturation. 
  
Table 9  
Confirmatory factor analyses for team effectiveness items 
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Model χ2 df p RMSEA [90% CI] pclose CFI TLI SRMR Δχ2 Δχ2 df Δχ2 p 
CCT Only 505.56 343 0.00 .06 [.05 .07] 0.16 0.95 0.94 0.08
Control Only 518.82 343 0.00 .06 [.05 .07] 0.11 0.95 0.94 0.07
Configural model (all free) 1038.36 693 0.00 .06 [.05 .06] 0.05 0.95 0.94 0.08
Invariance of factor loadings 1048.95 699 0.00 .06 [.05 .06] 0.05 0.95 0.94 0.08 10.59 6.00 0.10
Invariance of paths 1071.12 710 0.00 .06 [.05 .07] 0.04 0.95 0.94 0.08 22.18 11.00 0.02
Combined 476.79 343 0.00 .04 [.03 .04] 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.06
CCT Only 604.92 343 0.00 .07 [.06 .08] 0.00 0.93 0.92 0.08
Control Only 623.10 343 0.00 .07 [.06 .08] 0.00 0.92 0.91 0.08
Configural Model (all free) 1243.29 693 0.00 .07 [.07 .08] 0.00 0.93 0.91 0.08
Invariance of Factor Loadings 1255.85 699 0.00 .07 [.07 .08] 0.00 0.93 0.91 0.09 12.56 6.00 0.05
Invariance of Paths 1264.25 710 0.00 .07 [.07 .08] 0.00 0.93 0.92 0.09 8.41 11.00 0.68
Combined 749.53 343 0.00 .06 [.06 .07] 0.00 0.94 0.93 0.07
CCT Only 661.59 429 0.00 .06 [.05 .07] 0.04 0.95 0.94 0.09
Control Only 664.18 429 0.00 .06 [.05 .07] 0.04 0.94 0.93 0.07
Configural Model (all free) 1336.83 865 0.00 .06 [.05 .07] 0.01 0.94 0.94 0.08
Invariance of Factor Loadings 1354.93 872 0.00 .06 [.05 .07] 0.00 0.94 0.93 0.08 18.10 7.00 0.01
Invariance of Paths 1365.11 883 0.00 .06 [.05 .07] 0.01 0.94 0.94 0.09 10.18 11.00 0.51
Combined 702.59 429 0.00 .05 [.04 .05] 0.87 0.97 0.96 0.06
CCT Only 772.21 429 0.00 .07 [.07 .08] 0.00 0.93 0.92 0.08
Control Only 791.38 429 0.00 .07 [.07 .08] 0.00 0.92 0.91 0.08
Configural Model (all free) 1576.29 865 0.00 .07 [.07 .08] 0.00 0.92 0.91 0.08
Invariance of Factor Loadings 1593.14 872 0.00 .07 [.07 .08] 0.00 0.92 0.91 0.08 16.85 7.00 0.02
Invariance of Paths 1607.96 883 0.00 .07 [.07 .08] 0.00 0.92 0.91 0.09 14.83 11.00 0.19
Combined 908.44 429 0.00 .06 [.06 .07] 0.00 0.95 0.94 0.07
CCT Only 857.01 524 0.00 .07 [.06 .07] 0.00 0.92 0.91 0.08
Control Only 947.22 524 0.00 .07 [.07 .08] 0.00 0.90 0.89 0.08
Configural Model (all free) 1816.33 1055 0.00 .07 [.06 .07] 0.00 0.91 0.90 0.08
Invariance of Factor Loadings 1827.07 1063 0.00 .07 [.06 .07] 0.00 0.91 0.90 0.09 10.74 8.00 0.22
Invariance of Paths 1855.74 1074 0.00 .07 [.06 .07] 0.00 0.91 0.90 0.10 28.67 11.00 0.00
Combined 979.87 524 0.00 .05 [.05 .06] 0.13 0.94 0.94 0.07
CCT Only 932.93 524 0.00 .07 [.07 .08] 0.00 0.92 0.90 0.08
Control Only 1003.91 524 0.00 .08 [.07 .08] 0.00 0.90 0.88 0.08
Configural Model (all free) 1951.01 1055 0.00 .08 [.07 .08] 0.00 0.91 0.89 0.08
Invariance of Factor Loadings 1965.22 1063 0.00 .08 [.07 .08] 0.00 0.91 0.89 0.09 14.21 8.00 0.08
Invariance of Paths 1975.19 1074 0.00 .07 [.07 .08] 0.00 0.91 0.89 0.09 9.96 11.00 0.53
Combined 1159.18 524 0.00 .06 [.06 .07] 0.00 0.93 0.92 0.07
Model TC: Affective Trust with Team Cooperation
Model CV: Cognitive Trust with Team Viability
Model AV: Affective Trust with Team Viability
Model CE: Cognitive Trust with Team Efficacy
Model AE: Affective Trust with Team Efficacy
Model CC: Cognitive Trust with Team Cooperation
 
Table 10  
Fit statistics for trust-effectiveness models 
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Source SS df MS F p Partial Eta Squared
Post-Hoc w. 
Bonferroni
CogTrust 314.89 3 104.96 12.23 0.00 0.04 T1=T2
Training 2.13 1 2.13 0.05 0.83 0.00 -
CogTrust x Training 24.05 3 8.02 0.93 0.42 0.00 -
AffTrust 587.14 3 195.71 17.66 0.00 0.06 T1=T2; T3=T4
Training 34.01 1 34.01 0.47 0.50 0.00 -
AffTrust x Training 19.17 3 6.39 0.58 0.63 0.00 -
NegMon 18.50 2 9.25 0.80 0.45 0.00 -
Training 30.76 1 30.76 0.27 0.60 0.00 -
NegMon x Training 10.34 2 5.17 0.45 0.64 0.00 -
PosMon 54.22 2 27.11 9.16 0.00 0.03 T3=T4
Training 28.61 1 28.61 1.40 0.24 0.01 -
PosMon x Training 0.69 2 0.35 0.12 0.89 0.00 -
TE 152.50 2 76.25 12.92 0.00 0.04 *
Training 6.07 1 6.07 0.16 0.69 0.00 -
TE x Training 5.70 2 2.85 0.48 0.62 0.00 -
TV 34.29 2 17.15 4.91 0.01 0.02 *
Training 14.28 1 14.28 0.62 0.43 0.00 -
TV x Training 4.15 2 2.07 0.59 0.55 0.00 -
TC 131.78 2 65.89 10.30 0.00 0.03 T3=T4
Training 209.77 1 209.77 4.86 0.03 0.02 CCT>SURVIVAL
TV x Training 25.89 2 12.95 2.02 0.13 0.01 -
DDD 1787001.27 2 893500.64 41.46 0.00 0.13 *
Training 106755.84 2 53377.92 2.48 0.09 0.01 -
DDD x Training 155033 1 155032.69 3.33 0.07 0.01 -
Team Cooperation
DDD Scores
Cognitive Trust
Affective Trust
Negative Monitoring
Positive Monitoring
Team Efficacy
Team Viability
 
Note. Cognitive Trust and Affective Trust assessed at T1, T2, T3, T4. All other variables assessed at T2, T3, T4. 
*All post-hoc comparison significant 
- Omnibus test not significant 
Unless otherwise indicated (e.g., T1=T2), all other post-hoc comparisons were significant. 
 
Table 11  
Repeated measures ANOVA statistics 
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M1Score TV2 TC2 TE2 M1Score TV2 TC2 TE2
M2 .00 .21** .26** .35** .02 .15 .13 .15
MP2 -.03 .21** .32** .25** .03 .15 .19* .09
MN2 .02 .17* .19* .33** .01 .13 .08 .15
M2Score TV3 TC3 TE3 M2Score TV3 TC3 TE3
M3 -.02 .31** .30** .30** .17* .24** .26** .19*
MP3 .02 .37** .40** .32** .19* .33** .39** .28**
MN3 -.04 .24** .22** .25** .15 .17* .16* .12
M3Score TV4 TC4 TE4 M3Score TV4 TC4 TE4
M4 .13 .27** .25** .27** .02 .27** .25** .31**
MP4 .16 .36** .41** .35** .09 .39** .40** .42**
MN4 .10 .20* .15 .20* -.01 .19* .16 .22**
CCT Control
Time 1
Time 2
Time 3
 
 
*    Significant at p < .05 
**  Significant at p < .01 
 
Table 12  
Correlations between monitoring and effectiveness, by group 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
  
The primary purpose of this study was to evaluate whether a collaborative critical 
thinking intervention could have an impact on trust development and effectiveness in virtual 
teams. In light of previous findings (Hess et al., 2008), it was hypothesized that teams trained in 
CCT would outperform those not trained in CCT due to direct effects on performance (e.g., 
better decision making). Furthermore, it was argued that CCT training can enhance performance 
through indirect channels by increasing levels of trust and monitoring, which have well-
established positive relationships with team effectiveness (e.g., Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; De Jong & 
Elfring, 2010). This study did not find differences in positive or negative monitoring, cognitive 
or affective trust, objective performance, team viability, or team efficacy between team members 
trained in CCT and those trained in a control condition.  
CCT trained teams, however, consistently reported higher levels of team cooperation than 
teams not trained in CCT. The team cooperation instrument sought to determine the extent to 
which teammate interactions were harmonious by probing about how well a teammate got along 
with his or her team, how comfortable they were asking for help from the team, whether the team 
was cooperative, and whether everyone in the team is working towards the group’s goals 
(Conway et al., 2012). This is an interesting finding because perceptions of team cooperation can 
predict a team’s task outcomes (Pinto, Pinto, & Prescott, 1993). However, it is difficult to 
determine, within this study, the relationship between team cooperation and task performance 
since task performance was measured by the DDD simulation scores, which did not correlate 
with any of the other measures of effectiveness.  
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As expected, DDD scores did increase across the three performance periods, but it is 
evident that the DDD scores and the measures of perceived effectiveness measure different 
facets of performance. It was particularly surprising that there was no relationship between team 
efficacy and the DDD scores since the team efficacy items assessed perceptions of team 
competence (e.g., “My team is totally competent to complete the mission”). The lack of a 
relationship between the two can perhaps be explained by a lack of familiarity with the DDD 
scoring system. That is, participants did not understand what “good” team performance was 
within the context of the DDD system. Although participants were trained with respect to the 
point values of individual tasks in the scenarios, the system only provided feedback on each 
player’s own DDD score. The team’s total score as well as the individual scores of other players 
were not available to a given teammate. Teams were also only able to observe their own 
performance and did not have an opportunity to build accurate mental models of the ranges of 
performance possible within the simulation system. Thus, team members may have misjudged 
how well their teams actually performed.  
Collaborative critical thinking is a task best engaged in by domain experts (Hess et al., 
2008) because it is anchored in the recognition and metarecognition abilities that come only with 
extensive experience with a task (Cohen et al., 1996). The participants in this study were all 
novices with the DDD task. Despite training participants and allowing them the opportunity to 
develop their newly acquired knowledge in a practice mission, team members consistently 
increased their DDD scores across the performance episodes. While this may be an effect of a 
team process (e.g., improved coordination), the consistent score increases may also be a function 
of continued task learning. Future studies should ensure that practice effects are not present by 
choosing teams whose members are task experts before the team is trained in CCT. Furthermore, 
 108 
it may be beneficial to evaluate the effects of CCT training in face-to-face teams before applying 
it in virtual teams. Since CCT requires large volumes of information exchange, the constricted 
text-based communication channel used in this study may be insufficient for adequate 
information exchange. 
No study to date, including this one, has systematically captured and analyzed actual 
collaborative critical thinking behavior in teams. Presumably, CCT behavior is the mediator 
between CCT training and any hypothesized effects on performance, trust, and monitoring. Thus, 
although participants in the CCT group received CCT training, it is unclear whether or not they 
actually engaged in CCT behavior. Future studies should evaluate CCT behavior to determine 
whether CCT training leads to increases in CCT behavior. Within-group intervention studies 
where team collaborative critical thinking and performance is evaluated before and after a CCT 
intervention will be particularly useful in addressing this issue. Evaluating CCT behavior is a 
challenging prospect because it requires capturing and analyzing large volumes of team 
communication and because no system currently exists for systematically evaluating the quantity 
and quality of CCT behavior.  
The CCT framework of monitoring for uncertainty, assessing the opportunity and need to 
address it, conducting critiques to identify the sources of uncertainty, and devising actions that 
reduce their impact on the mission (Hess et al., 2008) should guide the development of behavior-
based evaluations of CCT. CCT training attempts to instill in trainees the need to explicitly 
consider states that would otherwise be confined to individual team members (e.g., considering 
plausible, alternative plans). Therefore, if teams are engaging in CCT as it is designed, CCT 
behaviors should be reflected in team communications. Hess et al. (2008) developed a series of 
CCT probes, which they as part of an electronic tool to remind team members to engage in CCT. 
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These probes should be used as a starting point for researchers seeking to codify CCT behaviors. 
For example, the behavior represented by the prompt, “the team has identified key assumptions 
that have yet to be tested concerning its goals” could be manifest in DDD chat transcripts as an 
explicit discussion by team members about whether each sensor provides accurate information. 
This assumption would be an important one to test since some sensors are designed to provide 
misleading information.  
This study used the CCT training protocol as it was originally developed by Hess et al. 
(2006). The training defines and characterizes CCT, and participants are taught about the steps 
involved in CCT and common barriers to critical thinking (e.g., schemas). However, participants 
are never provided an opportunity to actively practice collaborative critical thinking. Despite the 
participants clearly understanding the principles of CCT (as demonstrated by high performance 
on the CCT quiz), the training may not have been sufficient to actually provide participants with 
the skills to engage in collaborative critical thinking. Since trust was a variable of interest in this 
study, it was important to control contact between team members prior to their performing 
together. Therefore, structured CCT practice between team members came at the expense of 
creating carefully controlled laboratory conditions. Future iterations of the CCT training protocol 
should create opportunities for CCT practice by perhaps including specific behavioral examples 
of CCT or CCT role-playing within the context of the particular task the team will be performing 
(e.g., the DDD scenarios; Arthur, Bennett, Edens, & Bell, 2003). 
Relationship between trust and effectiveness 
A second purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between trust and 
effectiveness. A series of lagged latent factor models were estimated that examined the 
relationships between cognitive or affective trust and a variety of effectiveness measures (team 
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viability, team efficacy, team cooperation). Multiple group comparisons within each model 
demonstrated that the CCT and control training groups were invariant with respect to factor 
loadings and path parameter estimates. Thus, the groups were combined and a single model was 
estimated for each trust-effectiveness pairing. A strength of this study in investigating the 
trust!effectiveness and effectiveness!trust effects is the longitudinal nature of this study’s 
design such that there was temporal precedence between trust and effectiveness measurements. 
Many studies have demonstrated that trust is an important predictor of effectiveness (e.g., 
Costa, 2003; Costa, Roe, & Taillieu, 2001; Dirks, 2000; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Jarvenpaa & 
Leidner, 1998; Klimoski & Karol, 1976; Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995; Morgan & Hunt, 
1994; Smith & Barclay, 1997; Webber, 2008), although several studies found that trust does not 
predict effectiveness (Aubert & Kelsey, 2003; Dirks, 1999; Porter & Lilly, 1996; Pavlova, 2012). 
This study confirms the majority of previous findings that both cognitive and affective trust 
predict a variety of effectiveness outcomes (i.e., team viability, team cooperation, team efficacy). 
This strengthens the notion that finding effective interventions, as this study attempted to do 
through CCT training, to boost trust in virtual teams is critical for maximizing team performance.  
Several studies have also demonstrated that effectiveness predicts trust (Aubert & Kelsey, 
2003; Webber, 2008; Pavlova, 2012). The findings of this study echo previous research such that 
team viability, team cooperation, and team efficacy predict cognitive and affective trust. 
However, these results should be interpreted with caution because, although the teams performed 
before the trust measures were taken, there was little delay between the measurement of 
effectiveness and subsequent trust. Subsequent research could address this concern by temporally 
separating individual performance episodes to reflect natural breaks in team performance. 
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Allowing for time in between performance episodes also likely reflects a more accurate state of 
team interaction since teams perform together, separate, and reconvene.  
Monitoring 
A third aim of this study was to evaluate the relationships between monitoring and 
performance and between monitoring and trust. Previous research demonstrated that both types 
of monitoring are positively related to performance (Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2008; De Jong & 
Elfring, 2010; Fransen et al., 2011; Yee et al., 2010). The results of this study support these 
previous assertions that both positive and negative monitoring are positively related to 
performance. Thus, it appears that all monitoring is good monitoring with respect to team 
performance.  
The extant literature is divided as to whether monitoring is associated with trust or 
distrust. Monitoring has a “two-faced” nature (Bijlsma-Frankema, de Jong, & van de Bunt, 2008) 
such that teammates can monitor one another positively or negatively. Negative, or control-based, 
monitoring has been associated with interpersonal distrust (Costa et al., 2001; Costa, 2003; Costa 
& Anderson, 2011) while positive, or need-based, monitoring has been associated with affective 
bonds indicative of caring and trust among team members. No study to date had included both 
positive and negative monitoring measures to assess the relationship between the two types of 
trust (cognitive and affective) and the two types of monitoring (positive and negative). In this 
study, cognitive trust was not related to either type of monitoring, but affective trust was 
positively related to both positive and negative monitoring. That is, the greater the emotional 
bonds of care and concern between teammates (affective trust), the more teammates monitor one 
another both positively and negatively. This lack of dissociation perhaps implies that the notion 
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of positive and negative monitoring should be abandoned in favor of a unified conception of 
monitoring (i.e., teammates who care about one another, monitor one another).  
The lack of a relationship between cognitive trust and monitoring indicates that 
perceptions of team member competence, reliability, capability, and dependability were not 
associated with team monitoring. This finding opposes previous findings that diminished 
cognitive trust (derived from perceptions of team member performance) is the primary driver of 
negative monitoring (Costa, 2003). 
Trust 
Media Richness Theory (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Daft, Lengel, & Trevino, 1987), Social 
Presence Theory (Short, Williams, & Christie, 1976), and Time, Interaction, and Performance 
Theory (TIP; Mcgrath, 1991) suggest that virtual teams might have difficulty developing trust 
due to impoverished communication channels. Although comparing trust development under 
various media richness conditions was not an explicit aim of the present study, the text-based 
communication used by team members in the DDD scenarios was quite restrictive with respect to 
the exchange of social information (Daft, Lengel, and Trevino, 1987). Team members did not 
meet one another face-to-face at any point, and their interactions were restricted to gameplay in 
the DDD scenarios and text-based chat within the simulation. Yet despite these limitations, team 
members reported development in both cognitive and affective trust. Although both cognitive 
and affective trust developed throughout the teams’ time together, initial cognitive trust and 
cognitive trust at subsequent episodes was consistently higher than affective trust. Although this 
makes sense in light of previous findings that cognitive trust develops before affective trust 
(McAllister, 1995), the effect found in this study may not be generalizable to other settings. First, 
all of the participants were aware that their team members were students at a university, which 
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may constitute grounds for elevated levels of cognitive trust due to the competency requirements 
associated with a university-level education. Second, levels of affective trust in this study may 
have been elevated due to the shared social context of participants being aware that they all 
attend the same university. With these limitations in mind, the findings from the present study 
still demonstrate that it is possible to develop trust under near-boundary conditions of 
information richness. Enriching the communication medium (e.g., video-based chat) should 
increase the speed with which team members develop trust (Wilson et al., 2006). 
Propensity to trust has been associated with initial levels of trust (Costa, 2003), but 
participants in previous studies had been acquainted with one another prior to the measurement 
of initial trust. In this study, teammates were completely unfamiliar with one another, which 
made a compelling case for examining whether initial trust was associated with individual 
differences in the propensity to trust. The trust subscale of agreeableness used in this study 
primarily assessed trust as it related to the motivations of others (e.g., a belief in human goodness, 
being wary of others, trusting what people say). Thus, the scale was more indicative of the types 
of factors that might influence affective trust. However, propensity to trust was associated with 
initial cognitive, but not affective, trust. These results should be interpreted with caution because 
participants regularly reported that they had trouble filling out the initial trust questionnaire 
because they had little basis for making initial trust judgments. For example, one item in the 
initial cognitive trust scale stated, “Given my teammates’ track records, I see no reason to doubt 
their competence and preparation for our mission.” Thus, the relationship between propensity to 
trust and reported levels of team trust was assessed at the second time measurement, after team 
members had an opportunity to perform with their teams. At the second trust measurement, 
propensity to trust was positively associated with affective trust and not associated with 
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cognitive trust. Future studies should therefore incorporate propensity to trust as a covariate 
when measuring affective trust.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
While some limitations have already been discussed in the context of specific findings, 
there are several additional limitations that should be noted. As the overarching hypothesis of 
this study, that there would be differences between the CCT- and control-trained teams, was not 
supported, the recommendations for future directions stem from the limitations of this study and 
focus on adjusting conditions in future studies so as to maximize the potential effects of CCT 
training. 
Although this study did not find differences between teams trained in CCT and those 
trained in a control condition, the idea that CCT has promise as an effective intervention for 
affecting trust, monitoring, and team effectiveness should not be abandoned. The sample of 
undergraduate student teams in this study may not accurately reflect the population of teams that 
may benefit from CCT training. Team members were not proficient at the focal task. Thus, 
inexperience and task learning may have precluded the higher order recognition and 
metarecognition processes required to engage in collaborative critical thinking. Thus, teams 
composed of task domain experts may yet benefit from CCT training. As previously noted, the 
CCT training protocol should also be enhanced with deliberate practice of collaborative critical 
thinking within the context of the team’s task.  
 The objective performance measure in the present study did not correlated with the 
attitudinal measures of effectiveness. Although the objective effectiveness measures and the 
attitudinal measures should measure slightly different components of effectiveness, we 
nevertheless would expect these measures to covary. Future studies investigating effectiveness in 
 115 
teams can perhaps use a frame-of-reference training approach (Bernardin & Buckley, 1981) to 
demonstrate what constitutes effective and ineffective performance within the context of the 
team’s task. This may not be a problem for teams outside of a laboratory setting because 
performance in the real world is accompanied by consequences, so team members can form 
accurate impressions of performance effectiveness. 
 The present study used iterated performance episodes and the same monitoring, trust, and 
effectiveness measures were used across time points. Since participants are repeatedly asked the 
same questions throughout the study, this can create the possibility for demand characteristics. 
However, this possibility is mitigated by the fact that there is no reason to suspect systematic 
effects in a particular direction since the hypotheses about, for example, the direction of the 
relationship between trust and performance, are unknown to participants. Despite this assertion, 
it may still be useful to develop alternate forms of these measures since they are administered so 
closely in time. Another issue with respect to the measures used in this study is the motivation of 
participants to answer items carefully. There were many items administered at each measurement 
point, and participants may not have read all items carefully before responding. In several 
instances, research assistants noted that a particular team member finished his or her survey well 
ahead of the other team members. Furthermore, several of the reverse-worded items in the scales 
had lower factor loadings than other items in the scale. This also indicates the possibility of 
haphazard responding. Shortening the scales and creating alternate forms should help with this 
problem.  
Finally, these data were analyzed as two-level models such that repeated observations 
were nested within participants. However, participants were also nested at a third level, within 
teams. Thus, the methods of estimation used in the present study may underestimate the standard 
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errors of estimated coefficients, which could produce Type I errors for between-teams 
comparisons. However, since no differences were found between the two types of training, the 
possibility of an overly-liberal test of the null for between-teams effects is a moot issue. 
Conclusion  
 The present study examined the effects of collaborative critical thinking training on 
virtual team monitoring, trust, and effectiveness. No differences were discovered between teams 
trained in collaborative critical thinking and those trained in a control condition, with the 
exception of increased perceptions of collaboration in CCT trained teams. Several findings were 
replicated from previous studies. Specifically, trust and effectiveness drive one another over 
time, monitoring has a positive effect on team effectiveness, and propensity to trust is positively 
related to ratings of team trust. Future research should enhance the CCT training protocol by 
incorporating CCT practice and conduct studies using samples of team members who are 
proficient in their task work so as to maximize the potential benefits of CCT training.  
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Appendix A: DDD Scenario 1 Briefing 
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Appendix B: DDD Scenario 2 Briefing 
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Appendix D: CCT Training Quiz 
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Appendix E: SURVIVAL Training Activity 
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Appendix F: Background Questionnaire 
 
1. What is your gender?              Female            Male 
 
2. What is your age? _________________ 
 
3. Race (optional) 
 
_____Asian/Pacific Islander 
_____Black/African-American 
_____Caucasian 
_____Hispanic 
_____Native American/Alaska Native 
_____Other/Multi-Racial 
_____Decline to Respond 
 
4. What is your class rank? (please check one) 
 
_____Freshman 
_____Sophomore 
_____Junior 
_____Senior 
_____Graduate 
_____Non-degree seeking 
 
5. What is your current major? _________________ 
 
6. Do you have a job?          Yes         No 
 
If yes, how many hours per week do you work on average?  _____hrs/wk 
 
7a. On average, how often do you work as part of a team? (please check one) 
 
_____Never 
_____Rarely 
_____Sometimes 
_____Usually 
_____Always 
 
7b. Have you ever had any team-related training?  ____Yes  ____No 
 
If yes, please describe:  
 
8. Do you have military experience?  _____Yes      _____No 
 
If yes, please describe: 
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Appendix G: Personality Questionnaires 
 
Instructions:  
 
Below, there are phrases describing people's behaviors. Please use the rating scale below to 
describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as you generally are 
now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself, in 
relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same age. So that 
you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in absolute 
confidence. Please read each statement carefully, and then fill in the bubble that corresponds to 
the number on the scale. 
 
Trust Subscale (Agreeableness) 
 
I… 
How Accurately Can You Describe Yourself? 
Very 
Inaccurate 
Moderately 
Inaccurate 
Neither 
Inaccurate 
or Accurate 
Moderately 
Accurate 
Very 
Accurate 
Trust others 1 2 3 4 5 
Believe that others have good 
intentions 
1 2 3 4 5 
Trust what people say 1 2 3 4 5 
Believe that people are basically 
moral 
1 2 3 4 5 
Believe in human goodness 1 2 3 4 5 
Think that all will be well 1 2 3 4 5 
Distrust people** 1 2 3 4 5 
Suspect hidden motives in others** 1 2 3 4 5 
Am wary of others** 1 2 3 4 5 
Believe that people are essentially 
evil** 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
** = reverse scored 
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Overall Conscientiousness 
 
I… 
How Accurately Can You Describe Yourself? 
Very 
Inaccurate 
Moderately 
Inaccurate 
Neither 
Inaccurate 
or Accurate 
Moderately 
Accurate 
Very 
Accurate 
Am always prepared 1 2 3 4 5 
Pay attention to details 1 2 3 4 5 
Get chores done right away 1 2 3 4 5 
Carry out my plans 1 2 3 4 5 
Make plans and stick to them 1 2 3 4 5 
Waste my time ** 1 2 3 4 5 
Find it difficult to get down to work 
** 
1 2 3 4 5 
Do just enough work to get by ** 1 2 3 4 5 
Don't see things through ** 1 2 3 4 5 
Shirk my duties ** 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix H: Trust Questionnaire 
 
Cognition-based trust 
 
 
 
Completely 
Disagree 
Mostly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Mostly 
Agree 
Completely 
Agree 
My teammates 
approach the mission 
with professionalism 
and dedication 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Given my teammates’ 
track records, I see no 
reason to doubt their 
competence and 
preparation for our 
mission 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I can rely on my 
teammates not to 
make my job more 
difficult by careless 
work 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
My teammates 
consider my team to 
be trustworthy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
If people knew more 
about my teammates 
and their background, 
they would be more 
concerned and 
monitor their 
performance more 
closely ** 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
** = reverse coded 
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Affect-based trust 
 
 
 
Completely 
Disagree 
Mostly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Mostly 
Agree 
Completely 
Agree 
My team has a sharing 
relationship. We can 
freely share our ideas, 
concerns, and 
strategies 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I can talk freely to my 
teammates about 
difficulties I am 
having with the 
mission and know that 
they will want to listen 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
We would all feel a 
sense of loss if one of 
us was removed from 
the team and we could 
no longer work 
together 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
If I shared my 
problems with my 
teammates, I know 
they would respond 
constructively and 
caringly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I would have to say 
that we have all made 
considerable 
emotional investments 
in our working 
relationship 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Appendix I: Monitoring Questionnaires 
 
Need-based (positive) monitoring 
 
 
 
Completely 
Disagree 
Mostly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Mostly 
Agree 
Completely 
Agree 
Even when others 
think everything is 
fine, I know when 
my teammates are 
having difficulties 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
My teammates don’t 
have to tell me in 
order for me to know 
how things are going 
for them in the 
mission 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I monitor my 
teammates because 
it’s part of what a 
good teammate does 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Control-based (negative) monitoring 
 
 
 
Completely 
Disagree 
Mostly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Mostly 
Agree 
Completely 
Agree 
In this team we check 
whether everyone 
meets their obligations 
to the team 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
The quality of the work 
of my teammates is 
only maintained by my 
diligent monitoring 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
In this team we keep 
close track of whether 
everyone performs as 
expected 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
In this team we check 
whether everyone is 
doing what is expected 
of him/her 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
In this team we 
carefully monitor each 
other’s progress on 
his/her work 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I keep close track of 
my teammates, taking 
note of instances where 
they do not keep up 
with their 
responsibilities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I find that I do not need 
to monitor my 
teammates closely ** 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 ** = reverse coded 
 
  
 148 
Appendix J: Team Viability Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Completely 
Disagree 
Mostly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Mostly 
Agree 
Completely 
Agree 
I would be willing to 
work with this team on 
another mission 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I would avoid being on 
a mission with this 
team again ** 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I feel that this team 
would work well 
together on another 
task 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
** = reverse coded 
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Appendix K: Team Cooperation Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Completely 
Disagree 
Mostly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Mostly 
Agree 
Completely 
Agree 
I get along with my 
teammates 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I am comfortable 
asking for help from 
my teammates 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
My teammates are 
cooperative 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I feel like everyone in 
the team is working 
towards the groups’ 
goals 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I feel as if everyone 
in the group is 
looking out for their 
own interests ** 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
** = reverse coded 
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Appendix L: Team Efficacy Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Completely 
Disagree 
Mostly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Mostly 
Agree 
Completely 
Agree 
I feel confident about 
the capability of my 
team to perform the 
mission very well 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
My team is able to 
solve difficult tasks 
if we invest the 
necessary effort 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I feel confident that 
my team will be able 
to effectively 
manage unexpected 
complications 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
My team is totally 
competent to 
complete the mission 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Appendix M: DDD Quick Guide – Map and Actions 
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Appendix N: DDD Quick Guide – Tasks and Team Structure 
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